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The impact of tax differentials on pre-tax income of Swiss MNEs
Rafael Daniel Schlatter
Universität Zürich
Abstract
Multinational enterprises may use income shifting techniques such as strategic transfer pricing and debt shifting to reduce their
global tax burden. Due to comparably low corporate taxation, Switzerland is presumably a suitable location for tax planning
strategies. The thesis at hand examines income shifting among multinational enterprises headquartered in Switzerland in a
quantitative manner and provides indirect evidence of income shifting. Using a large panel dataset of foreign subsidiaries
of Swiss parent firms and employing a fixed-effects regression approach, the estimated semi-elasticity of pre-tax income with
respect to the statutory tax rate differential between the parent firm and the subsidiary is−1.458. This estimate is highly signif-
icant and larger than the estimates in comparable papers using European samples. Additionally, this thesis shows that income
shifting activities between the parent firm and the subsidiary increase with the parent’s ownership share in the subsidiary
and the firm size of the subsidiary. Hence, Swiss multinational enterprises preferably shift income using large, wholly-owned
subsidiaries.
Keywords: Income shifting, tax planning, Swiss multinationals, semi-elasticity, tax differential
1. Introduction
1.1. Multinational enterprises and income shifting
Firms operating in a multi-jurisdictional environment
can use two main income shifting techniques to reduce their
global tax burden Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003, 2227).
First, a multinational enterprise (MNE) can make strategic
use of transfer pricing (TP). To do so, a MNE may supply in-
termediate goods or services from an affiliate incorporated in
a low-tax (high-tax) jurisdiction to an affiliate incorporated
within a high-tax (low-tax) jurisdiction priced above (below)
the true price. Secondly, a MNE may grant a loan from an
affiliate residing in a low-tax country to an affiliate residing
in a high-tax country and benefit from the tax-deductibility
of interest payments in the high-tax country. In both cases,
income is shifted from a high-tax affiliate to a low-tax affili-
ate and the global tax bill of the MNE is smaller than it is in
the absence of income shifting. The effectivity of these tax
planning strategies is partially dependent on the peculiarities
of the legal setting. Specific national tax law, as well as in-
ternational double taxation agreements (DTA) may prevent
or deter income shifting of MNEs. In case tax saving poten-
tials are available, it is widely agreed on, that MNEs respond
mainly to tax differentials in statutory tax rates Haufler and
Schjelderup (2000, 307), Becker et al. (2012, 1499) That is,
the MNE strategically relocates income to affiliates residing
in low-tax countries by means of income shifting techniques.
Prior literature finds empirical, although mostly indirect,
evidence that MNEs shift income.1 Pre-tax income that is
sensitive to changes in tax differentials between affiliates of
a MNE is interpreted as indirect evidence for income shifting
Mooij and Ederveen (2008, 684). Examples of direct evi-
dence of income shifting are provided by Vicard (2015, 23-
24), Overesch (2006, 1-2) and Clausing (2003, 2222). Re-
cent research is often dedicated to finding specific opportu-
nities to shift income or identifying tax regulations that deter
income shifting. The former opportunities, also called drivers
of income shifting, are usually based on basic observable firm
and country characteristics. These drivers increase the sensi-
tivity of pre-tax income to changes in tax differentials, while
tax regulations decrease this sensitivity. Within Europe, espe-
cially German authors have taken up on the subject address-
ing German or European MNEs and the effectiveness of tax
legislations. The interest in the German case could stem from
the fact that Germany is characterized by high statutory cor-
porate income tax rates (CITR) and income potentially being
shifted out of the country Weichenrieder (2009, 284, 293).
1See Dharmapala (2014) or Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) for
overviews on evidence of income shifting.
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Huizinga and Laeven (2008, 1179) estimate that 13.6% of
Germany’s tax base in 1999 is lost due to income shifting.
For the opposite reason, Switzerland is presumably an inter-
esting location to study income shifting.
1.2. Objective
The objective of this thesis is to investigate whether Swiss
MNEs shift income or not. Therefore, the sensitivity of pre-
tax income of subsidiaries of Swiss MNEs to tax differentials
is empirically examined. This sensitivity is to be quantified in
terms of a semi-elasticity of the pre-tax income with respect
to (w.r.t.) the tax differential. It is further to be verified if firm
specific drivers of income shifting affect this semi-elasticity.
The results are put in a European context and various im-
plications are discussed. Few studies about income shifting
focus on single countries in Europe. Examples are Langli
and Saudagaran (2004) in the case of Norway, Weichenrieder
(2009) in the case of Germany, Mura et al. (2013) in the Case
of Italy and Vicard (2015) in the case of France. Up to the
current knowledge of the author of this thesis, there exists no
comparable research specifically addressing income shifting
of Swiss MNEs.2 The thesis at hand attempts to fill this gap
in the empirical literature on income shifting.
1.3. Research approach
2 summarizes prior literature. This literature is used in
two ways. First, drivers of income shifting based on certain
firm and country characteristics suitable for the empirical
analysis are identified. Secondly, tax legislation effectively
deterring income shifting is analyzed. Tax legislation is not
empirically studied, but used to qualitatively infer how effec-
tive Swiss tax legislation prevents income shifting. 3 provides
an overview on corporate taxation in Switzerland. 4 presents
a basic model to study income shifting of Swiss MNEs. This
model is theoretically established by Hines and Rice (1994)
and notably expanded by Huizinga and Laeven (2008). A
brief description of this model can be found in Dharmapala
(2014, 424-427). The basic model is then extended by in-
corporating the drivers of income shifting from the literature
review. The extended model allows to study how the sensitiv-
ity of pre-tax income to changes in tax differentials depends
on these drivers of income shifting. The earnings before in-
terest and taxes (EBIT) is employed as a measure of pre-tax
income. 5 describes the data and variables used. The empir-
ical approach relies mainly on financial firm data retrieved
from the ORBIS database. The data is collected at the sub-
sidiary level. Tax and macroeconomic data is obtained from
sources otherwise stated. Furthermore, 5 explains the sam-
ple construction process. 6 presents and summarizes the em-
pirical results of the basic and extended model. Additionally,
robustness tests are used to verify the results. 7 contains a
discussion of the results and provides implications for future
2Swiss firms have been included in previous studies on income shifting
within Europe. However, the number of Swiss firms being low, these studies
do not allow to draw specific conclusions for Swiss firms.
research. Specific issues examined are how the income shift-
ing behavior of Swiss MNEs developed over time, and which
locations play important roles in income shifting strategies of
Swiss MNEs. 8 addresses the limitations of the thesis and 9
concludes. Stata 14 StataCorp. (2015) is used for statistical
computation, and LATEXGroup (2017) and R 3.3.3 in conjunc-
ture with ggplot2 Team (2017), Wickham (2016) are used to
plot figures.
2. Literature review
The subject of income shifting started to become popular
in the United States (US) in the 1990’s. An early pioneer-
ing work by Hines and Rice (1994) influences the literature
up to the present. The authors argue that the income of a
firm is partly attributable to production factors such as cap-
ital and labor, and, if income is shifted, partly to tax rates.
They regress the pre-tax income on capital, labor, gross do-
mestic product (GDP) per capita and the effective tax rate
(ETR) Hines and Rice (1994, 161). This approach became
popular later on and Dharmapala (2014, 423) refers to it
as the "Hines and Rice approach". Hines and Rice apply a
log-level specification, allowing them to interpret the coef-
ficient estimate of the tax variable as a semielasticity. They
use country-aggregated data on US majority-owned affiliates
and find that a 1 percentage point increase in the ETR re-
duces reported income by roughly 3% Hines and Rice (1994,
161-162). Huizinga and Laeven (2008) draw upon their ap-
proach and use affiliate-level data of European firms from
the AMADEUS database and a composite tax variable. The
authors argue that income shifting can not only take place
between the parent and the subsidiary, but also between sub-
sidiaries of the same parent. They calculate an average tax
differential considering all affiliates of a MNE and further ar-
gue that for income shifting to take place, the MNE needs an
incentive and an opportunity to shift income. The incentive is
given by the average tax differential, the opportunity is given
by the scale of operations of the affiliate (which they proxy
with sales) and the composite tax variable is a combination of
the two. Hence, income shifting is large if the average tax dif-
ferential and the scale of operations are large Huizinga and
Laeven (2008, 1168-1169). Huizinga and Laeven regress the
EBIT on production inputs and the composite tax variable in
a log-level specification. Their preferred estimate is -1.766,
meaning that an increase in the composite tax variable by 1
percentage point is associated with a decrease in the EBIT of
1.766%, which is in line with income shifting Huizinga and
Laeven (2008, 1177).
Numerous authors use the models developed in these two
papers to introduce drivers of income shifting, and to explain
differences in income shifting behavior. Such studies typi-
cally argue, that the opportunities to shift income depend on
some observable firm and country characteristics. A standard
empirical approach to study drivers of income shifting is to
create an interaction term consisting of the driver and the
tax incentive variable, and integrating it within the "Hines
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and Rice approach". The drivers of income shifting consid-
ered in this thesis are: the scale of operations, the amount
of intangible assets, the ownership share of the parent in the
subsidiary and the direction of income shifting.3 The legal
environment further affects income shifting by reducing pos-
sibilities for tax savings in certain countries.
Huizinga and Laeven (2008, 1166–68) argue, that in-
come shifting is large if the scale of operations is large be-
cause the firms books and real trade have to be adjusted less
to justify transfer prices of the shifted goods (see also Hau-
fler and Schjelderup 2000, 319). Surprisingly, the impact of
the scale of operations, or equivalently firm size, is seldom
studied. Relying on the “Hines and Rice approach”, Beer and
Loeprick (2015, 436) find that both large and small MNEs
react stronger to tax differentials, implying that they shift in-
come to a larger extent than medium sized firms. Conover
and Nichols (2000, 207) use a different approach and find
that the income shifting behavior of US MNEs depends some-
how on the firm size. However, their results are a mere indi-
cation of a size effect in income shifting behavior (Conover
and Nichols (2000), 209), leaving the effect of the firm size
an interesting subject to study.
The role of intangible assets within the "Hines and Rice
approach" has been studied by Grubert (2003), Beer and
Loeprick (2015) and Dischinger and Riedel (2011). Because
it is difficult to determine arm’s length prices for intangi-
bles, the transfer of such provides opportuni- ties for tax sav-
ings through income shifting Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003,
2235), Beer and Loeprick (2015, 428). Grubert (2003, 229)
examines the effect of intangible assets owned by the par-
ent firm on income shifting and finds that a high intangi-
ble asset endowment of the parent firm facilitates income
shifting. In contrast hereto, Beer and Loeprick (2015) use
the intangible asset endowment of subsidiaries to explain
differences in income shifting behavior. They find that in-
come shifting increases with the subsidiary’s amount of in-
tangible assets Beer and Loeprick (2015, 434). Dischinger
and Riedel (2011, 699-700) find the same qualitative result
within a similar framework. Alternative research approaches
have further confirmed the use of intangibles in income shift-
ing strategies. Dischinger and Riedel (2008, 13) show that
intangible assets within MNEs are located at affiliates facing a
low statutory tax rate and Karkinsky and Riedel (2012, 182)
find that the tax rate is negatively correlated with the num-
ber of patent applications. Both findings suggest intangibles
are being used to shift income to low-tax jurisdictions.
Weichenrieder (2009) studies the impact of the owner-
ship share on the income shifting behavior of German foreign
direct investment (FDI). He argues that income shifting to
the parent firm is additionally costly due to opposition from
other shareholders with conflicting interests if the subsidiary
is not wholly-owned. These additional costs do not accrue
if income is shifted from the parent firm to the subsidiary
Weichenrieder (2009, 285). Using the microdatabase direct
3Other recently studied drivers are the firm complexity Beer and Loeprick
(2015) or the legal form of the firm Beuselinck et al. (2015).
investment (MiDi), Weichenrieder finds that wholly-owned
subsidiaries react stronger to tax rate changes, however, this
finding turns insignificant once the capital structure of the
subsidiary is accounted for Weichenrieder (2009, 295). De-
sai et al. (2004, 341-343) find that the profitability of non
wholly-owned subsidiaries is less sensitive to tax rates than
is that of wholly-owned subsidiaries. This is in line with in-
come shifting and they conclude that a MNE’s possibility to
minimize taxes is dampened by shared ownership Desai et al.
(2004, 341). Dischinger (2008) uses the "Hines and Rice
approach" and a continuous variable to measure the owner-
ship share and shows that subsidiaries owned with a higher
ownership share shift significantly more income Dischinger
(2008, 17-18). Further, Buettner and Wamser (2013, 84)
find that majority-owned subsidiaries use internal debt to
shift income to low-tax countries more pronounced than non
majority-owned subsidiaries.
Dischinger et al. (2014) focus on the direction of income
shifting. The authors distinguish income shifting towards the
parent firm from income shifting towards the subsidiary. Due
to a headquarter bias, it is more costly to shift income to
the subsidiary. Various arguments suggest the existence of a
headquarter bias. The authors mention that managers prefer
having assets under direct control rather than having them in
distant locations, and that funds might be located at the par-
ent firm to avoid potential withholding taxes upon dividend
repatriation Dischinger et al. (2014, 249). Their results im-
ply that the amount of shifted income is by more than 70%
smaller if the income is shifted away from the parent instead
of shifted towards the parent Dischinger et al. (2014, 268).
Various authors have studied the impact of tax and TP
legislation on the income shifting behavior of MNEs. Among
them are Lohse and Riedel (2012), Buettner et al. (2017),
Beuselinck et al. (2015) and Ruf and Weichenrieder (2012).
Lohse and Riedel (2012) assess the impact of TP regulations
on the income shifting behavior of European MNEs. They
split countries into three categories according to the strict-
ness of TP regulations. Category 1 includes countries with
no or very general regulations, but no documentation re-
quirements. Category 2 includes countries with TP regula-
tions including documentation requirements. Category 3 is
similar to category 2, but the TP documentation regulations
are required to be incorporated into national tax law Lohse
and Riedel (2012, 6-7, 19-20). The authors find that income
shifting among firms incorporated in countries with binding
TP regulations (countries assigned to category 2 and 3) is re-
duced by approximately 50% Lohse and Riedel (2012, 10-
11). Buettner et al. (2017) use a similar approach based
on a strictness of TP legislation overview provided by Lohse
et al. (2012, 21-24), but do not find a significant reduction
in income shifting due to stricter TP regulations. However,
they find that thin-capitalization rules reduce income shifting
Buettner et al. (2017, 13-14). Beuselinck et al. (2015) use a
broader system to quantify the strength of tax enforcement
in different countries. Factors they include are the tax audit
risk, related party disclosure requirements, existence of tax
favorable holding regimes, existence of thin-capitalization
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rules and DTAs and the possibility to carry-forward losses
Beuselinck et al. (2015, 715-716). They find that a weak
tax enforcement environment is associated with more income
shifting Beuselinck et al. (2015, 729-732). Ruf and Weichen-
rieder (2012) study the effect of controlled foreign corpo-
ration (CFC) rules on passive investment of German MNEs.
They find that both, a higher tax rate and binding CFC rules
are associated with lower passive investment. Specifically,
the passive assets of a foreign subsidiary are reduced by 77%
if that country is affected by the German CFC rules Ruf and
Weichenrieder (2012, 1513-1514). The authors conclude
that the German CFC rules effectively reduce tax revenue loss
by preventing the outflow of passive investments to low-tax
countries Ruf and Weichenrieder (2012, 1527).
The four drivers of income shifting are incorporated into
the basic model by Huizinga and Laeven (2008) in 4.2. The
tax legislation with a potentially dampening effect on income
shifting is not studied empirically since the sample includes
only subsidiaries of Swiss parent firms, which are subject to
the same tax system. Nonetheless, the results of these studies
give hints about how and to which extent Swiss corporate tax
legislation may prevent income shifting among Swiss MNEs.
Appendix A provides a structured classification of the litera-
ture reviewed here. A more comprehensive overview on em-
pirical literature can be found for example in Devereux and
Maffini (2007).
3. Switzerland as a location of income shifting
The purpose of this section is to evaluate whether Swiss
MNEs can possibly reduce their global tax burden using in-
come shifting techniques. To do so, relevant aspects of the
corporate tax environment in Switzerland are analyzed. Cor-
porate income taxes in Switzerland are levied on three or-
ganizational levels. On the federal level a flat rate of 8.5%
applies (the same rate applies regardless of the amount of
income), but differing rates apply on the cantonal level, and
rates expressed as percentages of the cantonal rate are levied
on the municipal level Galletta and Redonda (2017, 7). As
a consequence, tax rates are heterogeneous in Switzerland.
Lampart et al. (2012, 18) present ETRs for stock companies
in Switzerland between 13 and 23.7% in 2010, depending on
the exact location of incorporation. In a European context,
statutory CITRs in Switzerland may be considered to be of
low to moderate level.4 Considering Haufler and Schjelderup
(2000, 307), who state that income shifting reacts mainly to
statutory tax differentials, the low CITRs in Switzerland con-
stitute an incentive to shift income to Switzerland. Two ar-
guments favor the use of statutory tax rates over ETRs. First,
previous literature used mainly statutory rates and statutory
rates are easy to use, whereas it can be difficult to calculate
ETRs due to differing tax favors and deductions in different
locations. Secondly, statutory tax rates are determined by
governments only and are therefore not under the influence
4See 5.2 for a comparison of European and worldwide CITRs.
of the firm Dharmapala (2014, 425). A drawback of statu-
tory tax rates is that they reflect the shifting incentive less
accurate, especially in the presence of losses and loss carry-
forwards Overesch (2006, 16), Buettner and Wamser (2013,
74). To comply with previous literature, statutory tax rates
are used in this thesis.5
Low statutory CITRs are not sufficient to explain income
shifting. In case the home country of the parent firm taxes
income of its foreign subsidiaries, no tax saving is obtainable
by shifting income among affiliates. Double taxation can oc-
cur if the country of residence of the subsidiary also levies
taxes on the subsidiaries’ domestic income. To counteract
double taxation, Switzerland has concluded DTAs with major
industrial countries. The Swiss Confederation provides and
updates a list of all DTAs online, as of March 2017, Switzer-
land has signed 55 DTAs in accordance with the organization
for economic co-operation and development (OECD) stan-
dard, of which 50 are in force Confederation (2017). The
DTAs apply the exemption method, which excludes income
of foreign subsidiaries from taxation in Switzerland Enter-
prise (2016, 121), OECD (2014, 36-37). Therefore, Swiss
MNEs can possibly realize tax savings by shifting income to
Switzerland. This reasoning is confirmed by Heckemeyer and
Overesch (2013, 16). Further, Markle (2016, 8-9, 32-33)
presents empirical evidence that MNEs subject to a territo-
rial taxation system (countries that generally exempt foreign
income from home taxation) shift significantly more income
than MNEs subject to a worldwide taxation system. How-
ever, a taxation method with an exemption system by itself
is not tantamount with income shifting being present. As
mentioned in the introduction, certain tax legislations can
prevent or dampen income shifting through specific channels
such as debt shifting and manipulation of transfer prices. It is
thin-capitalization rules in the case of debt shifting Buettner
et al. (2017, 13-14) and TP legislation and documentation
requirements in the case of income shifting through strategic
TP Lohse and Riedel (2012, 15). The federal tax administra-
tion in Switzerland issues minimum and maximum interest
rates that are tax-deductible. If the charged rate is outside
this interval, it might be adjusted PwC (2015, 963). The
safe haven debt-to-equity ratio6 is 6:1. This ratio is generous
in comparison with other countries, meaning that the thin-
capitalization rules in Switzerland are rather loose in an in-
ternational context Buettner et al. (2012, 932).7 Switzerland
currently does not apply specific TP legislation or documen-
tation requirements, but follows the OECD guidelines on TP
PwC (2015, 962, 964). Unsurprisingly, Switzerland ranked
low in a worldwide overview on the strictness of national TP
regulations Lohse et al. (2012, 23-24).
5Loss-making subsidiaries are excluded from the sample to mitigate this
drawback (see 2.
6Interest payments are granted to be deductible if the debt-to-equity ratio
is below the safe haven debt-to-equity ratio Buettner et al. (2012, 931).
7The comparison dates back to 2005, however, as the authors point out,
it occurs seldom that a country abolishes thin-capitalization rules Buettner
et al. (2012, 932). PwC (2015, 963) mention that the 6:1 ratio is still appli-
cable in Switzerland in 2015.
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Thus, the low statutory CITRs within an exemption
method taxation system and the absence of strict thin-
capitalization rules and TP legislation allow Swiss MNEs
to realize tax savings by means of income shifting. More
specifically, tax savings can be realized by shifting income to
Switzerland, whenever the foreign tax rate is higher than the
Swiss rate. Further, according to Gehriger (2008, 243-244)
and Ruf and Weichenrieder (2012, 1527-1528), the absence
of CFC rules facilitates income shifting. A broader guide on
corporate taxation in Switzerland can be found for example
in Feld and Kirchgässner (2002, 131-135).
4. Theoretical considerations
4.1. Basic model
The basic model allows to study the relation between tax
differentials and pre-tax income of Swiss MNEs. The basic
model presented here constitutes an adaptation of the model
by Huizinga and Laeven (2008). The model is extended in
4.2 to incorporate the drivers of income shifting. The repre-
sentative MNE consists of two affiliates, the parent firm h in
Switzerland and the subsidiary i in a foreign country. Due to
limited access to ownership data, it is not possible to create a
comprehensive MNE dataset with groups consisting of more
than two affiliates, as for example in Huizinga and Laeven
(2008, 1169) or Beer and Loeprick (2015, 430). It is only
possible to link subsidiaries to Swiss shareholders. For the
purpose of this thesis, a firm is considered a subsidiary if the
Swiss parent firm owns at least 10% of the shares in the sub-
sidiary.8 It is assumed that both countries exempt foreign in-
come from taxation, but tax any income that has been shifted
to the country. This assumption is necessary for income shift-
ing to have a tax-saving effect and is standard in the litera-
ture. See for example Haufler and Schjelderup (2000, 312)
or Mintz and Smart (2004, 1151).
The statutory CITRs of the parent and the subsidiary are
rht , respectively ri t . Following Hines and Rice (1994, 159),
the total income of subsidiary i in year t, Πi t , equals the sum
of true but unobserved income (income in the absence of in-
come shifting) and shifted income. True income is denoted
by ΠTit and shifted income is denoted by si t . If ri t < rht
(ri t > rht), then si t > 0 (si t < 0) and income is shifted to
the subsidiary (to the parent). These are cases 1 and 2 in 1.
Income shifting is costly and prior literature states a modifica-
tion of the firms books and real trade and investment flows
to justify the income shifting Huizinga and Laeven (2008,
1166), or efforts undertaken to conceal the shifting Haufler
and Schjelderup (2000, 313) as explanation for the costs as-
sociated with income shifting. The costs of income shifting
8This might not always constitute a controlling interest. However, firms
with an ownership share of at least 10% are included in the sample to study
the effect of the ownership share on income shifting. Dischinger (2008,
16) applies a minimum ownership of 25% to study the impact on income
shifting. 5.1 elaborates on the issue of limited ownership information and
the 10% ownership threshold.
for subsidiary i in year t are denoted ci t . 1 shows a graphical
representation of this setup.
According to Hines and Rice (1994, 159) and Huizinga
and Laeven (2008, 1168-1169), the total pre-tax income of
subsidiary i in year t can be written as9
Πi t = Π
T
it + si t . (1)
In the following, the components of the total income are
described, starting with the shifted income. To derive the op-
timal amount of income shifting si t , an income function for
the MNE is set up. The income of the MNE consists of the true
income of both affiliates, plus the tax effects from income
shifting, minus the costs of income shifting Weichenrieder
(2009, 285), Dischinger et al. (2014, 250). The cost func-
tion specification is taken from Hines and Rice (1994, 159).
The cost function reflects that the costs of income shifting are
proportional with factor γ to the ratio of shifted income over
true income. Hence, the costs of income shifting are lower
if the true income of the subsidiary is high. This is also em-
phasized by Haufler and Schjelderup (2000, 319), who argue
that income shifting to a given country is less costly when the
true income or the level of investment in that country is high.
The cost function specification is given by
ci t(si t) =
γ
2
· s
2
i t
ΠTit
, (2)
which is a convex function applying equally to positive
and negative values of si t . The costs of shifting income are
assumed to be non-tax deductible Dischinger et al. (2014,
250). For simplicity, it is further assumed that these costs are
solely borne by the parent firm in Switzerland. Using the cost
function above, the total after-tax income of the representa-
tive MNE in year t can be expressed as
ΠMNE,t = (1− rht)(ΠTht − si t)− ci t(si t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
after-tax parent income
+ (1− ri t)(ΠTit + si t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
after-tax subsidiary income
,
(3)
where ΠTht is the true income of the parent h. Note that
income shifting by itself does not create additional income,
since income shifted to one affiliate is equal to the income
shifted away from the other affiliate Hines and Rice (1994,
159). Differentiating 3 w.r.t. si t , substituting the cost func-
tion and solving for sit yields the optimal amount of income
9As a result of the aforementioned data restriction, only subsidiaries but
not parents can be studied. The sole use of the subsidiary index i reflects
this. In fact, the only known information about the parent firm is that it is
located in Switzerland.
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Figure 1: Income shifting scenarios among Swiss multinational enterprises. Shifted income is depicted by solid arrows and
ownership stakes are depicted by doted arrows. Source: own figure.
shifting10
∂ΠMNE,t/∂ si t = (ri t − rht)− c′i t = 0
⇔ (ri t − rht) = −γ · si t
ΠTit
⇔ si t = −1
γ
·ΠTit(ri t − rht).
(4)
Substituting the third row from 4 into 1 and rearranging
results in
Πi t = Π
T
it − 1γ ·Π
T
it(ri t − rht)
= ΠTit ·

1− 1
γ
· (ri t − rht)

,
(5)
taking natural logarithms and approximating the second
line of 5 yields11
lnΠi t = lnΠ
T
it − 1γ · (ri t − rht). (6)
10It might seem that not the straight forward solution has been chosen
when solving for the optimal amount of si t . This is done to ensure com-
parability to recent literature, which usually defines the tax differential as
subsidiary tax rate minus the parent tax rate Dischinger et al. (for example
2014, 259).
11The approximation used is ln(1+ x) ≈ x , if x is close to 0 and is taken
from Huizinga and Laeven (2008, 1169). Note that ln(a · b) = ln(a)+ ln(b)
has been applied before using the approximation. Here x is equal to 1/γ ·
(ri t − rht ). With moderate tax differentials, this expression is reasonably
close to 0.
In line with Hines and Rice (1994, 160-161) and Huizinga
and Laeven (2008, 1169), the true income is assumed to be
the output Q i t produced according to a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function, minus the wage costs wi t . The above au-
thors propose the following specification, Q = kAαi t L
λ
i tK
φ
i t e
ui t ,
where k is a constant term, Ai t , Li t and Ki t are the technol-
ogy, labor and capital input of subsidiary i in year t, ui t is a
random term and e is Euler’s number. The wage costs wi t are
equal to the partial derivative of Q i t w.r.t. Li t , which gives
wi t = kλAαi t L
λ−1
i t K
φ
i t e
ui t . Subtracting the wage costs wi t from
the true income ΠTit is therefore equal to
ΠTit =Q i t −wi t = k(1−λ)Aαi t Lλi tKφi t eui t , (7)
and taking natural logarithms gives
lnΠTit = ln k+ ln(1−λ) +α · lnAi t +λ · ln Li t
+φ · lnKi t + ui t . (8)
Replacing lnΠTit in 6 with the expression given in 8 and
introducing empirically customary notation, yields the fol-
lowing basic model
lnΠi t = ln k+ ln(1−λ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ β0
+α · lnAi t +λ · ln Li t
+φ · lnKi t + ui t − 1
γ
· (ri t − rht)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ τi t
= β0 + β1 · lnAi t + β2 · ln Li t
+ β3 · lnKi t − β4 ·τi t + ui t ,
(9)
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where α = β1, λ = β2, φ = β3, 1/γ = β4 and the tax dif-
ferential is depicted by τi t . The model given in 9 corresponds
to the estimation equation from Huizinga and Laeven (2008,
1169). Their composite tax variable captures the incentive
to shift income among any affiliates of the MNE (the aver-
age tax differential) and the opportunity to shift income (the
scale of operations, proxied by sales). In contrast thereto, the
tax differential τi t only captures the incentive to shift income
between the subsidiary and the parent, which is a direct con-
sequence of the earlier mentioned limited access to owner-
ship data, which makes it impossible to calculate an average
tax differential.
4.2. Extended model
The model extensions are motivated by the research pre-
sented in 2 and allow to study income shifting in greater
detail. These studies identify individual opportunities to
shift income based on observable firm and country char-
acteristics. Other than Huizinga and Laeven (2008), who
assume the scale of operations of an affiliate in a given coun-
try is the sole driver of income shifting, additional factors are
considered here. Four drivers are examined. These drivers
are the scale of operation Huizinga and Laeven (2008),
the amount of intangible assets Beer and Loeprick (2015),
Dischinger and Riedel (2011), the ownership share Weichen-
rieder (2009), Dischinger (2008) and the direction of income
shifting Dischinger et al. (2014). These drivers extent the
basic model in 9 by introducing interaction terms consisting
of the drivers and the tax differential. This procedure is stan-
dard in the literature and is used by all authors mentioned
above, however, an in-depth analysis of the interaction terms
and corresponding marginal effects is often lacking. There-
fore, the recommendations of Brambor et al. (2006, 64) and
Berry et al. (2012, 660) are followed. Their main recom-
mendations are to include all variables that constitute an
interaction term, calculate marginal effects and correspond-
ing standard errors for a substantive range of the variables
involved, and present the results thereof in an informative
way.12
Huizinga and Laeven (2008, 1167-1168) argue that the
amount of income shifting depends on the affiliate’s scale of
operations in a given country. A firm with a large scale of
operations finds it easier to shift income than a firm with a
small scale of operations. To account for this possibility, an
interaction term consisting of the scale of operations and the
tax differential is added to the model in 9. Other than in
Huizinga and Laeven (2008, 1172), the capital input Ki t is
12The authors come from the field of politics, however, their recommen-
dations apply irrespective of the subject. The authors find that their main
recommendations are largely ignored in a survey of political studies. The
articles presented in 2 almost always include all variables constituting an
interaction (an exception are Huizinga and Laeven (2008, 1169) who state
that their composite tax variable is the product of two terms, but include
only the product and not the single terms). But, interaction terms are rarely
analyzed at the level of detail proposed by Brambor et al. (2006, 73-77)
(an exception are Beer and Loeprick (2015, 444) who include a figure of a
marginal effect of an interaction term).
used instead of sales to proxy for the scale of operations. This
is based on Haufler and Schjelderup (2000, 319) and has the
advantage of presumably being a more stable measure and
being less distorted by income shifting Huizinga and Laeven
(2008, 1174). It is further convenient as no additional vari-
able has to be included when interacting the tax differential
with the capital input. The standalone terms are kept in the
model. Beer and Loeprick (2015, 428) argue that intangible
assets such as trademarks, patents and copyrights are difficult
to value and provide opportunities for tax savings. Thus, a
strategic transfer price of an intangible asset deviating from
the arm’s length price is less costly to conceal from the tax au-
thority and income shifting increases with the amount of in-
tangibles. This argument is followed and an interaction term
consisting of the amount of intangibles, Ii t , and the tax dif-
ferential is introduced. Both, the interaction term and Ii t as
a standalone term are added to 9. A similar argument, with
income shifting depending on the ownership share of the par-
ent, is made by Dischinger and Riedel (2008, 5). He argues
that income shifting strategies with subsidiary i are hard to
implement if the ownership share of the parent in this sub-
sidiary is small and hence, tax savings from income shifting
are hard to realize. Dischinger measures the ownership with
a continuous variable, whereas Weichenrieder (2009, 292)
uses a categorical variable to distinguish wholly-owned sub-
sidiaries from non wholly-owned subsidiaries. The later ap-
proach is followed here, and two categorical ownership vari-
ables are introduced and each interacted with τi t . OW_51i t
is equal to 1 if the ownership share is between 51 and 99.99%
and 0 otherwise, and OW_100i t is equal to 1 if the subsidiary
is wholly-owned and 0 otherwise. Since time-invariant vari-
ables cannot be used in a fixed effects (FE) model, solely the
interaction terms are added to 9.13 Dischinger et al. (2014,
249, 251) provide several reasons why income shifting to the
parent is less costly than income shifting to the subsidiary.
Among them are withholding taxes upon repatriation of for-
eign income as dividends and managers preferring having
funds under control rather then having them overseas. To
implement this argument, the case distinction from 1 is ap-
plied to the model. In case 1, income is shifted to the sub-
sidiary (ri t < rht , si t > 0), and in case 2, income is shifted
to the parent (ri t > rht , si t < 0). The variable Case2i t equal
to 1 if the shifting direction is towards the parent (in case
2) and 0 otherwise (in case 1), is introduced and interacted
with τi t . Both the interaction and the standalone term are
added to the model in 9. The extended model is constructed
by combining the second line of 9 and the additional stan-
dalone and interaction terms mentioned above, and is given
13The ORBIS database reports the ownership for the last available year
only Dharmapala (2014, 430). For the purpose of the empirical analysis, it is
assumed that the ownership share remained unchanged as it was in the year
2015. Dischinger and Riedel (2008, 9) mentions that making this assump-
tion does not constitute a serious threat to the validity of his results. But
making this assumption results in having a time-invariant ownership vari-
able. As a consequence, only the interaction terms but not the standalone
terms can be added to 9. 8 elaborates and mentions that the coefficient
estimates of such a procedure are possibly biased.
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for subsidiary i in year t by
lnΠi t = β0 + β1 · lnAi t + β2 · lnKi t + β4 ·τi t + ui t︸ ︷︷ ︸
basic model from 9
− β5 ·τi t × lnKi t︸ ︷︷ ︸
capital interaction
+β6 · ln Ii t − β7 ·τi t × ln Ii t︸ ︷︷ ︸
intang. interact.
− β8 ·τi t ×OW_51i t︸ ︷︷ ︸
1st ownership interact.
−β9 ·τi t ×OW_100i t︸ ︷︷ ︸
2nd ownership interact.
+ β10 · Case2i t − β11 ·τi t × Case2i t︸ ︷︷ ︸
direction interaction
.
(10)
10 constitutes the extended model. Note that the interac-
tion terms enter with a negative sign. This is due to the defi-
nition of the tax differential in 4 and the deliberate coding of
the categorical variables included in the interaction terms.14
The extended model allows to compute and interpret specific
marginal effects, although this advantage comes at the price
of increased model complexity. The subsequent subsection is
intended to give an idea on model interpretation and how the
extended model can be used to gain a more detailed insight
into income shifting activities of Swiss MNEs.
4.3. Model interpretation and marginal effects
A negative sign of β4 is in line with income shifting Becker
and Riedel (2012, 447). If τi t is negative (case 1, ri t < rht ,
si t > 0), income is shifted to the subsidiary. As a conse-
quence, the subsidiary’s total income Πi t increases. A nega-
tive sign of β4 in 9,10 reflects case 1 correctly. If τi t is positive
(case 2, ri t > rht , si t < 0), income is shifted to the parent. As
a consequence, the subsidiary’s total income Πi t decreases.
A negative sign of β4 also reflects case 2 correctly. More-
over, the marginal effect of τi t on Πi t in the basic model is
given by the partial derivative ∂ lnΠi t/∂ τi t = −β4 Buettner
et al. (2017, 11). Since the basic model is written in a log-
level specification, the marginal effect can be interpreted as
a semi-elasticity Wooldridge (2009, 43-46). That is the per-
centage change in Πi t associated with a 1 percentage point
change in τi t Dharmapala (2014, 429). An estimate of -1.5
translates into a 1.5% decrease in Πi t due to a 1 percentage
point increase in τi t , where the increase in τi t is either a
result of an increase in ri t or a decrease in rht .
The extended model in 10 is harder to interpret because
the influence of τi t depends on the drivers of income shifting.
Partially differentiating 10 w.r.t. τi t yields
∂ lnΠi t
∂ τi t
= −β4 − β5 × lnKi t − β7 × ln Ii t
− β8 ×OW_51i t − β9 ×OW_100i t
− β11 × Case2i t ,
(11)
14The categorical variables OW_51i t , OW_100i t and Case2i t are coded in
the same way as in the original papers. Doing so facilitates the comparison
of the results.
which varies with the capital input, the amount of in-
tangibles and the categorical ownership and shifting direc-
tion variables. The marginal effect in 11 still represents a
semi-elasticity, and the coefficient estimates of the interaction
terms from 10 depict how much the semi-elasticity changes
w.r.t. the drivers of income shifting. For example, an esti-
mate of β5 of 0.5 results in a decrease (an absolute increase)
of the marginal effect by −1.5, given lnKi t = 3, an owner-
ship share between 10 and 50.99% and shifting direction to
the subsidiary (the three last terms in 11 fall away). Given
these characteristics, β4 now depicts the marginal effect for
a subsidiary with no capital. This example highlights two
important points when it comes to interaction terms. First,
marginal effects according to 11 reflect firm specific oppor-
tunities to shift income. For example, in the above setting
the marginal effect for a subsidiary with capital of lnKi t = 3
is −3, which is twice as large as the marginal effect for a
subsidiary with no capital. Thus, the extended model al-
lows to study income shifting behavior among Swiss MNEs
in greater detail. Secondly, it highlights the importance of
calculating meaningful marginal effects and standard errors
as proposed by Brambor et al. (2006, 74). A typical regres-
sion table reports coefficient estimates only. However, the
estimate of β4 is of little use in the extended model, since
the sample includes no observations with zero capital. Al-
though a regression table allows to calculate marginal effects
for various combinations and levels of the regressors, there is
no way of calculating correct standard errors and therefore,
the significance of the marginal effect can not be assessed.
Consider again the above example. The marginal effect for
a subsidiary with the given characteristics is ∂ lnΠi t/∂ τi t =
β4 − β5 × lnKi t , and the standard error (SE) is given by
SE

∂ lnΠi t
∂ τi t

= [varβ4 + (lnKi t)
2 · varβ5
+ 2 · lnKi t · cov(β4β5)]1/2
(12)
The formula can be found in Brambor et al. (2006, 70)
and Aiken and West (1991, 16), who also provide a variety of
standard errors for common interaction models.15 Typically,
this quantity can not be assessed by the reader, as covariance
terms are seldom reported. Therefore, a strong focus is put
on meaningful marginal effects and their graphical represen-
tation in 6 when presenting the estimation results.
4.4. Estimation approach
Huizinga and Laeven (2008, 1172-1173) estimate their
model by ordinary least squares (OLS). This is reasonable
since their data is a cross-section from 1999. The panel
dataset in this thesis allows to control for unobserved het-
erogeneity among subsidiaries. As a consequence, FE estima-
15The formulas can be assessed on Golder’s website Golder (2017). The
formulas allow to calculate standard errors for all marginal effects presented
in 6.1, 6.2, 6.3.
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tion is used here.16 A vector of yearly categorical variables
to model a time trend, and a vector of categorical variables
depicting the industry-affiliation interacted with the yearly
categorical variables are added to the model in 10. The Euro-
pean classification of economic activities (NACE) rev. 2 main
sector codes are used to distinguish industries Commission
(2008, 57). The sample is limited to firms in the manufac-
turing and wholesale and retail industries, where a Cobb-
Douglas production function to describe output presumably
seems appropriate Huizinga and Laeven (for example 2008,
1172). This restriction is relaxed in robustness tests in 6.5.
The FE estimation approach is fully described below in 13.
Since the basic model from 9 is nested within the extended
model from 10, this is done for the extended model only.
lnΠi t = β0 + β1 · lnAi t + β2 · lnKi t + β4 ·τi t
− β5 ·τi t × lnKi t + β6 · ln Ii t − β7 ·τi t × ln Ii t
− β8 ·τi t ×OW_51i t − β9 ·τi t ×OW_100i t
+ β10 · Case2i t − β11 ·τi t × Case2i t +Ti tθi t
+Ui tξi t +ρi + ui t ,
(13)
where
i is the subsidiary index,
t is the time index ranging from 2007 to 2015,
Πi t is the total pre-tax income, measured as EBIT,
Ai t is the technology input, proxied by the GDP per
capita in local currency,
Li t is the labor input, measured as costs of employees,
Ki t is the capital input, measured as fixed assets,
τi t is the tax differential, calculated as τi t = (ri t − rht)
Ii t are fixed intangible assets,
OW_51i t is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the sub-
sidiary is owned by a Swiss parent firm with a share
between 51 and 99.99% and 0 otherwise,
OW_100i t is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the
subsidiary is wholly-owned by a Swiss parent firm and
0 otherwise,
Case2i t is a categorical variable equal to 1 if the in-
come shifting direction is from the subsidiary to the
parent firm in Switzerland and 0 otherwise,
Ti t is a vector of dimensionality (1 × 8), indicating
which year the observation falls into, Ti t = (T08 T09
T10 T11 T12 T13 T14 T15), the year 2007 being the ref-
erence category, and each of the categorical variables
Tt being equal to 1 if the observation falls into year t
and 0 otherwise,
θi t is a vector of dimensionality (8 × 1), holding the
coefficients for each year except 2007, θ′i t = (θ08 θ09
θ10 θ11 θ12 θ13 θ14 θ15)
Ui t is a vector of dimensionality (1 × 8), holding
industry-year categorical variables, each being equal
16FE estimation is preferred over random effects (RE) estimation, based on
the results of a Hausman specification test. The result of this test is provided
in Appendix B.2.
to 1 if the observation falls into that industry in that
year and 0 otherwise,
ξi t is a vector of dimensionality (8×1), holding the co-
efficients for the industry-year categorical variables17
ρi is the subsidiary-fixed effect, and
ui t is the error term.
Directly estimating 13 is one way of studying income
shifting among Swiss MNEs. In order to get a more com-
plete picture of the underlying income shifting patterns, var-
ious adaptations of 13 are estimated. In a first step, the ba-
sic model excluding all interaction terms is estimated. In a
second step, 13 including single drivers of income shifting
separately is estimated. In a third step, all drivers of income
shifting are studied within the same model, which is done
by directly estimating 13 as stated above. The following sec-
tion describes the data used in estimation and 6 presents the
empirical estimation results.
5. Data and sample
5.1. Financial data and country statistics
The sample period covers 9 years, ranging from 2007 to
2015. The financial firm data is retrieved from the ORBIS
database provided by the Bureau Van Dijk (BvD), which also
provides access to the AMADEUS database, the European
subset of ORBIS.18 Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2015, 14) mention
that the ORBIS and AMADEUS databases do not overlap in
100% of the cases and the coverage being higher in the OR-
BIS database. Therefore, the ORBIS database is used. The
main variables downloaded include: EBIT, profit/loss (P/L)
before tax, total assets, fixed assets, tangible fixed assets, in-
tangible fixed assets, debt, equity, the number and costs of
employees, the country’s international standard organization
(ISO) code, the BvD identification number (ID) and the NACE
rev. 2 main sectors. The GDP data is taken from the World
Bank Databank world-development-indicators Bank (2017).
Subsidiaries included in the sample are firms with a Swiss
parent firm holding at least 10% of the shares. The sam-
ple firms are allowed to have subsidiaries themselves. The
BvD ID number is used as the subsidiary identifier within the
dataset. The data is downloaded through the BvD web in-
terface and access is provided by the University of Zurich.
A major advantage of the ORBIS database is the possibility
to link ownership data with accounting data to create MNE-
panel datasets Beer and Loeprick (for example 2015, 430).
Thus, it is possible to link parent firms with all available sub-
sidiaries. Unfortunately, the access provided by the Univer-
sity of Zurich does not include the ownership data. It is there-
fore not possible to link parent firms to subsidiaries and vice
17See Appendix B.1 for additional comments on matrix algebra and the
NACE rev. 2 industry classification. The dimensionality of the vectors Uit
and ?it depends on the number of industries included in the analysis.
18A short overview on the ORBIS database can be found in Ribeiro et al.
(2010).
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Table 1: ORBIS search strategy and data restrictions
Notes. aLeverage is calculated as ln debt over ln total assets, therefore ratios below 1 are negative after taking natural logarithms. The maximum GDP per
capita is below the maximum EBIT and P/L before tax. This seems unreasonable, but it should be kept in mind that the GDP per capita is measured in local
currency units, whereas all other financial data is measured in Swiss Francs (CHF). Source: own table.
Search step / restriction Subsidiaries Percentage Last step
All active companies and companies with unknown situation 177’064’116 100.000% 100.000%
Worldwide companies 174’596’526 98.606% 98.606%
Subsidiaries with a non-missing data value in at least one year between 2007 and 2015a 6’968’497 3.936% 3.991%
ubsidiaries owned by at least one shareholder located in Switzerland, owning between 10 and 100%
of the shares
10’070 .006% .145%
Exclusion of subsidiaries with no tax or GDP data available 10’066 .006% 99.960%
Exclusion of subsidiaries located in Switzerland 9’812 .006% 97.438%
Subsidiaries in manufacturing and wholesale and retail industry where a Cobb-Douglass production
function is appropriate
5’414 .003% 55.177%
Exclusion of observations with insufficient datab 4’862 .003% 89.804%
versa. However, another feature of the database can be ex-
ploited to retrieve some ownership information. To compute
the tax differential τi t , it is not necessary to know which firm
is the owner of a foreign subsidiary. It is sufficient to select
subsidiaries hold by a Swiss parent firm and download the
countries of residence of these subsidiaries. By downloading
firms with a Swiss shareholder, a range for the ownership
share can be specified, however, the dataset will not contain
the specific ownership shares of the individual firms. This
method is used to download firms that are owned by a Swiss
parent firm by at least 10%.19 1 summarizes the search strat-
egy and data trimming procedures used to retrieve the data
from ORBIS.
In a second step, the search strategy from 1 is reused to
download subsidiaries with an ownership share between 51
and 99.99%. In a third step, firms with an ownership of 100%
are downloaded. Matching the three datasets on the BvD
ID numbers and the calendar year allows to distinct three
categories. The first category includes subsidiaries with an
ownership share between 10 and 50.99%. The second cate-
gory includes subsidiaries with an ownership share between
51 and 99.99%, for which the categorical variable OW_51i t
equals 1. The third category includes wholly-owned sub-
sidiaries for which the variable OW_100i t equals 1. The
lower bound of the ownership is chosen as low as 10% for
the following reasons. First, a shareholder can reach a con-
trolling interest with less than 51% in case different share
classes with differing voting rights exist and secondly, affil-
iated shareholders can reach a controlling interest combin-
ing their voting rights. The low boundary ensures to detect
potential income shifting in these cases. If these cases are
19To ensure that the subsidiaries are part of a MNE and not owned by an
individual person, the following types of shareholders are selected: banks
and financial companies, insurance companies, industrial companies, pri-
vate equity firms, hedge funds, venture capital, mutual and pension funds,
nominees, trusts, trustees, foundations, research institutes, public authori-
ties, states and governments.
irrelevant, the above approach is likely to understate the ex-
tent of income shifting, which is considered less severe than
overstating.
The raw dataset downloaded from ORBIS includes finan-
cial data on 10’070 subsidiaries, of which 4’862 are suitable
for the empirical analysis. The average subsidiary is observed
over 5.53 years, resulting in a total sample size of 26’869 ob-
servations. The data restrictions shown in 1 represent the
sample that is used to estimate the basic model and most of
the variations of the extended model. The sample size is re-
duced when intangibles are included in the model. The sam-
ple statistics provided in 2 refer to the sample described in
1. Additionally, the distributions of some of these variables
are shown in Appendix C.1. The regression results in 6 state
the sample size for each model specification. The continu-
ous variables are highly skewed to the right. Natural loga-
rithms are taken to counteract. Looking at means, medians,
25 and 75 percentiles of the continuous variables, taking nat-
ural logarithms seems to result in useful distributions. The
row of intangibles in 2 shows that the sample size is reduced
to 17’897 observations when intangible assets are included.
The tax differential τi t is mostly positive, indicating that only
few observations in the dataset have a smaller CITR than
Switzerland, which is tantamount with most subsidiaries be-
ing faced with an incentive to shift income to Switzerland.
This is confirmed by the mean of Case2i t , which shows that
90.01% of the observations have an incentive to shift income
to Switzerland. Tax rates and tax differentials are discussed
in more detail in 5.2. The means of the categorical variables
OW_51i t and OW_100i t show that 12.5% of the subsidiaries
are owned with an ownership share between 51 and 99.99%,
69.9% of the subsidiaries are wholly-owned and 17.6% of the
subsidiaries are owned with an ownership share between 10
and 50.99%.
3 shows the pairwise correlation coefficients among the
main variables used. Continuous variables have been log-
transformed before calculations. The inputs to the Cobb-
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Table 3: Pairwise correlations of main variables
Notes. The number of observations is given in parentheses. Source: own table.
Variable Πi t Ki t Li t Ai t Ii t LEVi t
ln fixed assets, (Ki t) 0.703
(26’869)
ln costs of employees, (Li t) 0.770 0.736
(26’869) (26’869)
ln GDP per capita, (Ai t) 0.038 -0.001 -0.011
(26’869) (26’869) (26’869)
ln intangible assets, (Ii t) 0.510 0.640 0.571 0.013
(17’897) (17’897) (17’897) (17’897)
Leverage, (LEVi t) -0.091 -0.059 0.014 -0.059 0.036
(26’577) (26’577) (26’577) (17’680) (26’577)
Tax differential, (τi t) 0.047 0.023 0.166 -0.277 0.124 0.129
(26’869) (26’869) (26’869) (26’869) (17’897) (26’577)
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Figure 2: Spatial distribution of subsidiaries. Countries with no subsidiaries are blank. The number of subsidiaries is presented
in 4. The number of subsidiaries have been log-transformed to get a meaningful color scale. A detailed map of Europe is
provided in Appendix C.3. Source: own figure.
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Douglas production function, namely fixed assets, costs of
employees and the GDP per capita are all positively related
to the EBIT. A positive coefficient is observed for the corre-
lation between the EBIT and the tax differential. A negative
coefficient is in line with income shifting. Hence, the data
from 3 does not suggest income shifting being present. How-
ever, the coefficients caption only pairwise correlations, thus
neglecting other, more complicated interdependencies in the
dataset. A multi-variate analysis is essential.
The sample contains financial data of subsidiaries from
63 countries. 4 shows the number of subsidiaries per coun-
try. A vast majority of subsidiaries is residing in Europe. Sub-
sidiaries from France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United
Kingdom (UK) make up roughly half of the sample size. A lot
of subsidiaries furthermore reside in Eastern European coun-
tries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Ro-
mania. It is striking how few subsidiaries from Asia, America
and Africa are included in the sample. Further, almost no ob-
servation from tax havens are included in the sample. Euro-
pean subsidiaries might be numerous for two reasons. First,
Swiss MNEs could be less likely to have subsidiaries in distant
locations, and secondly, different regions might be unequally
covered in ORBIS.
Various authors, among them Cobham and Loretz (2014,
14), Clausing (2016, 908) and Fuest and Riedel (2010, 18)
mention that the coverage for developing countries, espe-
cially countries in Africa, and tax havens is lower than for Eu-
ropean countries.20 However, this does not explain why there
are few observations in developed countries outside of Eu-
rope, such as the US, Canada, Japan or Australia. 2 presents
a spatial distribution of the subsidiaries of Swiss MNEs across
the world, amplifying the insights derived from 4.
The world map suggests that the distance between
Switzerland and the foreign country is correlated with the
number of subsidiaries in that foreign country. Clausing
(2016, 716) finds that the distance between US subsidiaries
and the parent firm and the income of these subsidiaries are
negatively correlated. Her results favor the first argument
why the sample contains few subsidiaries outside of Europe.
However, it is not possible to exclude restrictions on data
availability outside Europe as the reason for this supposed
correlation. The data is used for the empirical analysis as
presented here.
5.2. Tax rates and tax differentials
National tax rates are available at KPMG’s corporate tax
rates table website KPMG (2017).21 KPMG provides yearly
CITRs for countries worldwide. The tax rates are matched
with the financial firm data using the ISO 2 country codes
and the calendar year as matching variables, using the Stata
20Desai et al. (2006, 529-530) find that tax havens are used by US MNEs
to avoid taxes. In case Swiss MNEs do so, the results presented in 6.1,6.2,
6.3 might be understated. 8 elaborates on this issue.
21KPMG does not provide an export function. Therefore the data is down-
loaded from Damodaran’s website Damodaran (2017). According to his
wish, credit is given to KPMG.
package "kountry" Raciborski (2008). Aggregated summary
statistics for tax rates and tax differentials are displayed in 5.
The computation of national tax rates differs among coun-
tries and might affect the empirical analysis.22 Tax rates for
Switzerland are calculated as the average of the tax rates in
the capital cities of the cantons KPMG (2017).
As described in 4.1, the tax differential represents the in-
centive to shift income. Other factors possibly affecting the
shifting incentive are neglected.23 Positive values of τi t in 5
represent an incentives to shift income to Switzerland. The
mean tax differentials show that the Swiss tax rate is on aver-
age below the tax rates in almost all world regions. The mean
tax differentials between Switzerland and Asia, the Americas
and Western Europe are particularly high, indicating large
tax saving opportunities. 3,4 show mean tax rates over time.
The Swiss tax rate is below the mean tax rate in the Ameri-
cas, Asia, Europe and Oceania during all sample years. The
mean African tax rate is below the Swiss tax rate during the
first years of the sample period, but is well above the Swiss
rate at the end of the sample period.
Since a vast majority of the sample subsidiaries is located
in Europe, a closer comparison of European CITRs is desir-
able. 4 allows to compare European tax rates in greater de-
tail. The mean tax rate in Western Europe is higher than
in the other regions during all sample years. The mean tax
rates in Northern and Southern Europe show a slightly de-
creasing trend over the sample period, whereas the mean
tax rates in Eastern and Western Europe show a more stable
trend. The Swiss tax rate fell continuously over the sample
period. Clearly, Swiss MNEs with subsidiaries in Western Eu-
rope have an incentive to shift income to Switzerland. Mean
tax rates in Southern and Northern Europe are higher than
the Swiss tax rate, although the difference is not as obvious as
it is between Western Europe and Switzerland. Eastern Eu-
ropean tax rates are comparable to the Swiss tax rate, leav-
ing the country-specific incentives to shift income small or
ambiguous. Finally, 5 provides a snapshot of the tax differ-
entials between Switzerland and European countries for the
most recent year 2015. The left map shows tax differentials
> 0 (shifting incentive to the parent in Switzerland), and
the right map shows tax differentials < 0 (shifting incentive
away from the parent). Comparing the two maps indicates
that most European countries are faced with an incentive to
shift income to Switzerland in 2015. 5 visually underlines the
insights derived within this subsection. A complete overview
on all variables and datasources used is provided in Appendix
C.6.
22See Appendix C.4 for peculiarities in national tax rate calculations po-
tentially affecting the analysis.
23Another factor potentially affecting the incentive to shift income are
withholding taxes. Markle (2016, 15) uses withholding taxes as part of
his tax incentive variable. However, Scholes and Wolfson (1992, 289) note
that the use of TP techniques typically avoids withholding taxes entirely. In
this thesis, withholding taxes are potentially influential only when income is
shifted out of Switzerland but is intended to be repatriated later. Since this
could be the case for 10% of the sample at most (see 2), withholding taxes
are neglected.
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Figure 3: Corporate tax rates across the world. Solid lines represent unweighted mean tax rates, dashed lines depict minimum
and maximum tax rates and the shaded area shows the mean tax rate ±1 standard deviation. The red line depicts the Swiss
tax rate. A detailed version of this figure is shown in Appendix C.5. Tax data is taken from KPMG (2017). Countries are
assigned to geographic regions based on Nations (2017), see Appendix C.2. Source: own figure.
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Figure 4: Corporate tax rates across Europe. Solid lines represent unweighted mean tax rates, dashed lines depict minimum
and maximum tax rates and the shaded area shows the mean tax rate ±1 standard deviation. The red line depicts the Swiss
tax rate. Tax data is taken from KPMG (2017). Countries are assigned to geographic regions based on Nations (2017), see
Appendix C.2. Source: own figure.
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Table 4: Subsidiaries per country
Notes. Numbers in parentheses represent observations numbers and the corresponding percentages. aOne firm (8 observations) residing in La Reunion is
treated as residing in France. bTwo firms (17 observations) residing on the Canary Islands are treated as residing in Spain. The United Nations (UN) region
classification used to assign countries to geographic regions can be found in Appendix C.2. Source: own table.
Country Subs. Obs. Subs.(%) Obs.(%)
Algeria 7 (10) 0.14 (0.04)
Argentina 1 (3) 0.02 (0.01)
Australia 1 (2) 0.02 (0.01)
Austria 139 (790) 2.86 (2.94)
Belgium 151 (997) 3.11 (3.71)
Bermuda 2 (13) 0.04 (0.05)
Bosnia & Herzegovina 21 (110) 0.43 (0.05)
Bulgaria 48 (266) 0.99 (0.99)
Canada 1 (1) 0.02 (0.00)
Chili 1 (1) 0.02 (0.00)
Costa Rica 1 (5) 0.02 (0.02)
Croatia 30 (186) 0.62 (0.69)
Czech Republic 230 (1’419) 4.73 (5.28)
Denmark 102 (396) 2.10 (1.47)
Ecuador 2 (5) 0.04 (0.02)
Estonia 23 (132) 0.47 (0.49)
Finland 70 (427) 1.44 (1.59)
Francea 543 (3’155) 11.17 (11.74)
Germany 703 (3’630) 14.46 (13.51)
Greece 1 (9) 0.02 (0.03)
Hong Kong 2 (15) 0.04 (0.06)
Hungary 87 (556) 1.79 (2.07)
Iceland 1 (3) 0.02 (0.01)
India 71 (207) 1.46 (0.77)
Indonesia 4 (34) 0.08 (0.13)
Ireland 24 (133) 0.49 (0.49)
Israel 1 (1) 0.02 (0.00)
Italy 741 (4’192) 15.24 (15.60)
Japan 10 (30) 0.21 (0.11)
Jamaica 1 (4) 0.02 (0.01)
Kenya 3 (18) 0.06 (0.07)
Kuwait 1 (7) 0.02 (0.03)
Latvia 1 (3) 0.02 (0.01)
Luxembourg 12 (54) 0.25 (0.20)
Macedonia 16 (34) 0.33 (0.13)
Malaysia 15 (87) 0.31 (0.32)
Malta 2 (8) 0.04 (0.03)
Montenegro 4 (14) 0.08 (0.05)
Morocco 10 (16) 0.21 (0.06)
Netherlands 101 (431) 2.08 (1.60)
New Zealand 38 (198) 0.78 (0.74)
Nigeria 2 (18) 0.04 (0.07)
Norway 64 (424) 1.32 (1.58)
Pakistan 3 (19) 0.06 (0.07)
Philippines 1 (9) 0.02 (0.03)
(Continued)
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Table 4—continued
Country Subs. Obs. Subs.(%) Obs.(%)
Poland 235 (1’306) 4.83 (4.86)
Portugal 92 (551) 1.89 (2.05)
Republic of Korea 52 (350) 1.07 (1.30)
Romania 173 (948) 3.56 (3.53)
Serbia 82 (387) 1.69 (1.44)
Singapore 2 (10) 0.04 (0.04)
Slovakia 91 (517) 1.87 (1.92)
Slovenia 52 (326) 1.07 (1.21)
South Africa 1 (6) 0.02 (0.02)
Spainb 283 (1’612) 5.82 (6.00)
Sri Lanka 1 (9) 0.02 (0.03)
Sweden 145 (866) 2.98 (3.22)
Thailand 14 (31) 0.29 (0.12)
Ukraine 24 (112) 0.49 (0.42)
United Arab Emirates 1 (2) 0.02 (0.01)
UK 316 (1’751) 6.50 (6.52)
US 2 (8) 0.04 (0.03)
Uruguay 4 (4) 0.08 (0.01)
Africa (68) (0.25)
Americas (45) (0.17)
Asia (811) (3.02)
Oceania (200) (0.74)
Europe (25’745) (95.82)
World 4’862 (26’869) 100.00 (100.00)
6. Empirical results
6.1. Basic model results
6 presents the results from estimating the basic model
in 9 using the sample described in 1. Regressions (1) and
(2) include a set of year, respectively a set of year and a
set of industry-year categorical variables. Regression (2)
constitutes the benchmark regression.24 Regression (3)
includes frequently used control variables Weichenrieder
(2009, 293), Lohse and Riedel (2012, 8). Regression (4)
includes a quadratic term of the tax differential, allowing to
check for a curvature in the relationship between the EBIT
and the tax differential Hines and Rice (1994, 162-163).
Thus, it can be verified whether the proposed model specifi-
cation in 9 is appropriate or not.
The inputs of the Cobb-Douglas production function are
positive and significant (with the exception of GDP per capita
in regression (3)), meaning that higher inputs lead to higher
output. These estimates can be interpreted as elasticities
Wooldridge (2009, 45-46). Specifically in regression (1),
increasing the GDP per capita, the fixed assets or the costs
of employees by 1%, corresponds to an increase in the EBIT
24Regression diagnostics for the benchmark regression are presented in
Appendix D.2.
of 0.257%, 0.064% or 0.465%, respectively. The tax differ-
ential enters significantly negative in all specifications, thus
providing indirect evidence of income shifting among Swiss
MNEs. The semi-elasticity of the EBIT w.r.t the tax differ-
ential in the benchmark regression (2) is −1.458, indicating
that an increase in the tax differential by 1 percentage point
is associated with a decrease in the EBIT of 1.458%. It is ir-
relevant whether this increase in τi t is due to an increase in
the subsidiary’s CITR or a decrease in the Swiss CITR. The
semi-elasticities in regressions (1) and (3) and subsequent
semi-elasticities (or marginal effects, the two terms are used
interchangeably when appropriate), can be interpreted ac-
cordingly. The leverage and the GDP growth enter signifi-
cantly negative, respectively significantly positive. The co-
efficients of leverage and GDP growth can be interpreted as
semi-elasticities.
The estimate of the tax differential in regression (4) can-
not be interpreted without considering the estimate of the
squared tax differential simultaneously. The marginal effect
of the tax differential is given by ∂ lnΠi t/∂ τi t = −1.504 +
0.363×2·τi t .25 6 plots the marginal effect over the complete
range of tax differentials. The marginal effect is significant
25Interpreting the coefficient of the tax differential as a conditional semi-
elasticity when the tax differential is 0 is theoretically pointless since it cor-
responds to having no incentive to shift income.
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Table 5: Tax rate statistics
Notes. The tax data is from KPMG (2017). Countries are assigned to geographic regions based on Nations (2017), see Appendix C.2. All calculations are
unweighted. The number of observations is equal to the number of countries per region multiplied by 9, since data is downloaded for 2007-2015. Source:
own table.
UN geographic region Minimum 25th Perc. Median Mean 75th Perc. Maximum Stan. dev. No. of Obs.
Panel A: Local tax rates, (t i t)
Africa 0.000 0.000 0.280 0.187 0.300 0.369 0.150 45
Americas 0.000 0.225 0.265 0.259 0.333 0.400 0.111 81
Asia 0.000 0.240 0.280 0.291 0.350 0.550 0.108 126
Europe (whole continent) 0.090 0.160 0.220 0.219 0.280 0.384 0.075 297
Eastern Europe 0.100 0.160 0.190 0.179 0.190 0.250 0.040 63
Northern Europe 0.125 0.180 0.220 0.216 0.260 0.300 0.053 81
Southern Europe 0.090 0.100 0.200 0.206 0.300 0.373 0.092 99
Western Europe 0.250 0.250 0.294 0.295 0.333 0.384 0.037 54
Oceania 0.280 0.280 0.300 0.296 0.300 0.330 0.012 18
World 0.000 0.190 0.250 0.241 0.300 0.550 0.101 567
Panel B: Tax differentials, (τi t)
Africa -0.206 -0.188 0.101 0.000 0.121 0.165 0.153 45
Americas -0.206 0.044 0.086 0.073 0.146 0.221 0.111 81
Asia -0.179 0.052 0.092 0.105 0.158 0.371 0.107 126
Europe (whole continent) -0.116 -0.021 0.031 0.033 0.090 0.177 0.075 297
Eastern Europe -0.106 -0.028 0.003 -0.007 0.011 0.067 0.041 63
Northern Europe -0.081 -0.026 0.040 0.030 0.073 0.108 0.053 81
Southern Europe -0.116 -0.081 0.019 0.019 0.111 0.171 0.092 99
Western Europe 0.044 0.070 0.109 0.109 0.148 0.177 0.037 54
Oceania 0.094 0.101 0.110 0.110 0.119 0.124 0.009 18
World -0.206 -0.002 0.067 0.054 0.119 0.371 0.101 567
whenever the confidence intervals (CI) do not cross the zero-
line. This is the case for more than 90% of the tax differen-
tials. However, the slope of the marginal effect in 6 is close
to 0, indicating that the interaction is economically mean-
ingless. Berry et al. (2012, 662) describe such a marginal
effect (with a slope close to 0) as evidence against a theory
presuming an interaction effect. Hence, the model specifi-
cation in 9 seems to be appropriate and a quadratic term is
not included in subsequent analysis. An economic argument
against the use of a quadratic term is the following. A flat tax
rate implies that the tax saving for a subsidiary engaging in
income shifting activities is proportional to the change in the
tax differential. Whether the tax rate change happens at low
or high tax differentials is irrelevant. However, Hines and
Rice (1994, 163) as well as Dowd et al. (2017, 6, 8) find that
a quadratic term is statistically and economically meaningful
in their analysis.
6.2. Extended model results including single interactions
The results of estimating the extended model including
single interaction terms are presented in 7. Each interaction
term representing a driver of income shifting is analyzed sep-
arately. Regressions (1) and (2) test the theory that income
shifting depends on the scale of operations, as proposed by
Huizinga and Laeven (2008). Regression (1) includes an in-
teraction term consisting of the tax differential and the cap-
ital input, measured as ln fixed assets. The interaction term
in regression (2) uses the categorical variable K_di t , equal
to 1 if the ln fixed assets are above mean and 0 otherwise.
Regression (1) shows a significant positive coefficient of the
tax differential and a significant negative coefficient of the
interaction term. Since the inputs of the production function
have been interpreted in the preceding section, the focus is
put on the tax differential and the interaction terms. The co-
efficient of the tax differential represents the semi-elasticity
of the EBIT w.r.t. the tax differential for subsidiaries with zero
ln fixed assets, thus it is not meaningful to interpret this coef-
ficient in isolation. The coefficient of the interaction term de-
picts how much the above mentioned semi-elasticity changes
when ln fixed assets are increased. The marginal effect of the
tax differential is given by the partial derivative and is equal
to ∂ lnΠi t/∂ τi t = 3.637− 0.346× lnKi t , which is visualized
in 7. Evaluation at the sample mean of ln fixed assets yields
a significant effect of −1.187∗∗∗.26
The minimum amount of ln fixed assets required for sig-
nificant income shifting to be present is given by the point
of intersection between the zero-line and the upper limit of
the 90% CI. 7 shows that this is the case once the ln fixed
assets have reached roughly 13. The slope of the marginal
effect is given by the coefficient estimate of the interaction
term and is equal to −0.346. The results from regression (1)
imply that income shifting increases with fixed assets once
a certain threshold of ln fixed assets is reached. A possible
explanation for this result are fixed costs associated with in-
26See 2 in 5.1 for sample statistics.
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Figure 5: Differences in tax differentials in 2015 in Europe. The left map shows tax differentials for subsidiaries with incentive
to shift to the parent firm (ri t > rht) and the right map shows tax differentials for subsidiaries with incentive to shift away
from the parent firm (ri t < rht). Source: own figure.
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Figure 6: Marginal effect of the tax differential in the
quadratic regression (4) in 6. The solid line shows the
marginal effect according to the partial derivative of regres-
sion (4) in 6, and the shaded area represents the 90% confi-
dence interval. The grey bar indicates the range of the mid-
dle 90% of the distribution of tax differentials (observations
between the 5th and 95th percentile). Source: own figure,
based on Berry et al. (2012, 661)
come shifting. A subsidiary shifts income only if the bene-
fits from shifting exceed the costs. The negative coefficient
of the capital interaction indicates that the opportunities to
shift income, and hence the benefits from income shifting, in-
crease with the scale of operations. The marginal effect sug-
gests that the benefits from in- come shifting exceed the costs
once the ln fixed assets are larger than roughly 13. Dharma-
pala (2014, 423-424) mentions the possibility of fixed costs
associated with income shifting and regression (1) supports
this presumption. Regression (2) shows the same qualitative
result as regression (1). The marginal effect of the tax dif-
ferential is −0.396 (−2.086∗∗∗) for subsidiaries with below
(above) mean ln fixed assets and the coefficient of the inter-
action term is −1.690, which is equal to the difference be-
tween the marginal effects. The marginal effect is significant
for subsidiaries with above mean ln fixed assets only, which
supports the insight regarding fixed costs derived from the
results of regression (1).
Regressions (3) and (4) test whether income shifting de-
pends on the intangible asset endowment of the subsidiary.
Regression (3) includes an interaction term consisting of the
tax differential and the intangible assets of the subsidiary,
measured as ln intangible fixed assets. Regression (4) in-
cludes an interaction term consisting of the tax differential
and the categorical variable I_di t , equal to 1 if the ln in-
tangible fixed assets are above mean and 0 otherwise. The
right graph of 7 shows the marginal effect of the tax differ-
ential in regression (3), which is given by ∂ lnΠi t/∂ τi t =
0.939 − 0.160 × ln Ii t . Evaluation at the sample mean of ln
intangible fixed assets results in an insignificant marginal ef-
fect of−0.808. 7 supports the presumption that income shift-
ing involves fixed costs, suggesting that firms with ln intangi-
ble fixed assets larger than roughly 11.5 significantly shift in-
come. Regression (4) conveys the same qualitative result, the
marginal effect of the tax differential is −0.639 (−1.124∗∗)
for subsidiaries with below (above) mean ln intangible fixed
assets. The difference between the two effects is not signif-
icant as indicated by the interaction term of −0.485 with a
low t-statistic.27 Regressions (3) and (4) provide moderate
support for the theory that income shifting increases with the
amount of intangible assets.
Regressions (5) and (6) test the theory that income shift-
ing increases with the ownership share. Regression (5) in-
cludes the categorical ownership variable OW_100i t inter-
acted with the tax differential. This procedure is compara-
ble to Weichenrieder (2009, 285), with the exception that it
is applied to both shifting directions. Regression (6) addi-
tionally includes the ownership variable OW_51i t interacted
with the tax differential. Note that the ownership variables
can not be included as standalone variables since they do not
vary over time. The marginal effects of the tax differential in
27See Appendix D.2 for additional comments on this result.
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Table 6: Basic model results
Notes. Regressions (1) and (2) are the basic and benchmark regression excluding and including a set of industry-year categorical variables. Regression (3)
includes leverage and GDP growth as additional control variables. Regression (4) includes a quadratic term. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote significance on the 10, 5
and 1% significance level. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis and standard errors are clustered at the subsidiary level to control for heteroscedasticity
and autocorrelation Hoechle (2007, 285). Source: own table.
Subsidiary-fixed effects, panel 2007-2015, dependent variable: ln EBIT, Πi t
Regression Basic Benchmark Add. controls Quadratic
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln GDP per capita, (Ai t) 0.257∗ 0.235∗ 0.218 0.237
(1.926) (1.762) (1.630) (1.770)∗
ln fixed assets, (Ki t) 0.064∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗
(5.162) (5.096) (5.283) (5.096)
ln cost of employees, (Li t) 0.465∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗
(13.549) (13.553) (13.453) (13.554)
Leverage, ln debt over −0.254∗∗∗
ln total assets, (LEVi t) (−8.253)
GDP growth, (GDP_Gi t) 0.018∗∗∗
(4.646)
Tax differential, (τi t) −1.526∗∗∗ −1.458∗∗∗ −1.139∗∗∗ −1.504∗∗∗
(−3.564) (−3.390) (−2.671) (−2.445)
Tax differential squared, ((τi t)2) 0.363
(0.117)
Year dummies p p p p
Industry-year dummies p p p
No. of observations 26’869 26’869 26’577 26’869
No. of subsidiaries 4’862 4’862 4’818 4’862
Within R2 0.066 0.066 0.074 0.066
Overall F -test 51.143 31.386 32.912 29.889
regressions (5) and (6) are
∂ lnΠi t
∂ τi t
=

β4 = 0.263, if OW_100i t = 0
β4 + β9 = −2.102∗∗∗, if OW_100i t = 1
∂ lnΠi t
∂ τi t
=

β4 = −0.233, if OW_51i t = OW_100i t = 0
β4 + β8 = −0.318, if OW_51i t = 1, OW_100i t = 0
β4 + β9 = −2.101∗∗∗, if OW_51i t = 0, OW_100i t = 1
(14)
The coefficient estimates of the interaction term τi t ×
OW_100i t in regressions (5) and (6) are significant and neg-
ative, indicating that wholly-owned subsidiaries shift more
income than subsidiaries with an ownership share between
10 and 50.99%. τi t×OW_51i t enters regression (6) insignif-
icant. The coefficients of the interaction terms give estimates
and significances for the differences in income shifting be-
tween the three ownership categories of subsidiaries. The
marginal effects show that only wholly-owned subsidiaries
are engaged in significant income shifting. Both marginal ef-
fects for subsidiaries with an ownership share between 10
and 50.99% and subsidiaries with an ownership share be-
tween 51 and 99.99% are not significant. Regressions (5)
and (6) not only support the theory that a higher owner-
ship share is associated with a higher amount of income
shifting, but moreover suggest that only wholly-owned sub-
sidiaries shift income. One potential problem with the ap-
proach in regression (5) is the following. In Subsection 5.1,
it is argued that subsidiaries with less than 51% ownership
can possibly shift income. If this is not justified, the vari-
able OW_100i t is impractical since it measures the difference
in the extent of income shifting between wholly-owned sub-
sidiaries and (at least some) subsidiaries that have, other
than assumed, no possibility to shift income (subsidiaries
with an ownership share below 51%). Thus, the variable
OW_100i t is trivial and unsurprisingly shows a significantly
negative coefficient. Regression (5) is therefore rerun on a
subsample of subsidiaries with an ownership share of at least
51% (22’084 observations).28 The coefficient of the interac-
tion term τi t × OW_100i t is equal to −2.122∗ and signifi-
cant on the 10% confidence level. The marginal effects are
−0.012 (−2.134∗∗∗) for non wholly-owned (wholly-owned)
subsidiaries, of which the latter is significant on the 1% con-
fidence level. These results are similar to regression (5), con-
firming that the coefficient of the interaction term in regres-
sion (5) is not significant due to trivial reasons.
28This variation of regression (5) in 7 is described verbally only. A results
table is not shown.
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Table 7: Extended model results including single interactions
Notes. Regressions (1) and (2) include the capital interaction, (1) includes a continuous specification and (2) a categorical specification. Regressions (3)
and (4) include the intangibles interaction, (3) includes a continuous specification and (4) a categorical specification. Regressions (5) and (6) include the
ownership interactions, (5) includes only one interaction and (6) includes both interactions. Regression (7) includes the shifting direction interaction. ∗, ∗∗,
∗∗∗ denote significance on the 10, 5, 1% significance level. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis and standard errors are clustered at the subsidiary level to
control for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation Hoechle (2007, 285). Source: own table.
Subsidiary-fixed effects, panel 2007-2015, dependent variable: ln EBIT, Πi t
Income shifting driver Capital interaction Intangibles interaction Ownership interactions Direction int.
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln GDP per capita, (Ai t ) 0.220∗ 0.228∗ 0.228 0.226 0.236∗ 0.236∗ 0.226∗
(1.651) (1.706) (1.344) (1.329) (1.777) (1.776) (1.651)
ln fixed assets, (Ki t ) 0.089∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗
(5.742) (4.028) (3.998) (5.087) (5.087) (5.094)
ln cost of employees, (Li t ) 0.464∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗ 0.462∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗
(13.601) (14.463) (10.720) (10.718) (13.552) (13.551) (13.553)
Tax differential, (τi t ) 3.637∗ −0.396 0.939 −0.639 −0.263 −0.233 −1.330
(1.950) (−0.689) (0.804) (−1.091) (−0.393) (−0.286) (−0.961)
Capital interaction, (cont., τi t × Ki t) −0.346∗∗∗
(−2.816)
ln fixed assets, (cat., K_di t) 0.221
∗∗∗
(3.750)
Capital interaction, (cat., τi t × K_di t) −1.690∗∗∗
(−3.191)
ln intangible assets, (Ii t ) 0.007
(0.645)
Intangible interaction, (cont., τi t × Ii t) −0.160∗
(−1.816)
ln intangible assets, (cat., I_di t) −0.003
(−0.054)
Intangibles interaction, (cat., τi t × I_di t) (−0.485)
(−1.073)
2nd ownership interaction, (OW_100i t) −1.839∗∗ −1.868∗
(−2.205) (−1.946)
1st ownership interaction, (OW_51i t) −0.085
(−0.058)
Shifting direction, (Case2i t ) 0.007
(0.115)
Direction interaction, (τi t × Case2i t ) −0.179
(−0.117)
Year dummies p p p p p p p
Industry-year dummies p p p p p p p
No. of observations 26’869 26’869 17’897 17’897 26’869 26’869 26’869
No. of subsidiaries 4’862 4’862 3’698 3’698 4’862 4’862 4’862
Within R2 0.067 0.065 0.064 0.064 0.066 0.066 0.066
Overall F -test 30.365 28.078 19.271 19.017 30.032 28.670 28.537
Regression (7) includes an interaction term consisting of
the tax differential and the shifting direction, depicted by
Case2i t . Case2i t is equal to 1 if the shifting direction is to
the parent (ri t > rht , si t < 0), and 0 otherwise (ri t < rht ,
si t > 0). The coefficient estimate is negative but insignificant
and the marginal effects of the tax differential are given by
∂ lnΠi t
∂ τi t
=
¨
β4 = −1.330, if Case2i t = 0
β4 + β11 = −1.509∗∗∗, if Case2i t = 1 (15)
indicating that income shifting to the parent firm is sig-
nificant, whereas no income is shifted to the subsidiaries. It
should be borne in mind that the coefficient estimate and
the marginal effects test different hypotheses, and that com-
paring marginal effects does not allow to judge on the sig-
nificance of the difference between them. To gain a deeper
insight, regression (7) is rerun separately on the subsample
of manufacturing subsidiaries and on the subsample of sub-
sidiaries in the wholesale and retail sector. The marginal ef-
fects of the tax differential are −2.124∗∗∗ (1.591) for man-
ufacturing subsidiaries with shifting direction to the parent
firm (to the subsidiary), and −1.026 (−7.623∗∗∗) for whole-
sale and retail subsidiaries with shifting direction to the par-
ent firm (to the subsidiary). The coefficient of the direc-
tion interaction is significant for both industries, but with
differing signs.29 Hence, manufacturing subsidiaries shift
29The regression results and additional comments are shown in table 20
and in Appendix D.3.
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Figure 7: Marginal effect of the tax differential in regressions (1) and (3) in 7. The solid line shows the marginal effect
according to the partial derivative of regression (4) in 6, and the shaded area represents the 90% confidence interval. The
grey bar indicates the range of the middle 90% of the distribution of tax differentials (observations between the 5th and 95th
percentile). Source: own figure, based on Berry et al. (2012, 661)
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Figure 8: 3D Marginal effect of the tax differential in regression (1) in 8. The marginal effect is plotted for wholly-owned
subsidiaries with shifting direction to the parent firm. The plane represents the marginal effect according to the partial
derivative of regression (1) in 8. Source: own figure.
mainly income to the parent in Switzerland and wholesale
and retail subsidiaries receive income shifted away from their
parent firms in Switzerland. The somewhat unclear result
from regression (7) in 7 might stem from offsetting industry-
dependent shifting behavior.
The analysis of single drivers of income shifting allows to
draw the following conclusions. Once a certain size threshold
has been reached, income shifting increases with the scale
of operations, suggesting that income shifting gives rise to
fixed costs. The same argument applies to the amount of
intangible assets. Wholly-owned subsidiaries engage in in-
come shifting activities, but non wholly-owned subsidiaries
do not. Moreover, the analysis suggests that once below
100%, the ownership share is irrelevant.30 On average, Swiss
30Interpretation of the results including ownership interactions are only
valid under the proviso that the coefficient estimates from regression (5)
and (6) in 7 are unbiased. 8 elaborates.
MNEs only shift income to the parent firm in Switzerland, but
not to foreign subsidiaries, however, the detailed analysis of
the shifting direction interaction suggests that there are dif-
ferences in income shifting patterns across industries. The
conclusions drawn so far are only valid within the respective
framework of analysis. How the different interaction terms
affect each other is not possible to assess with the results from
7. The following subsection is intended to shed light on how
the different drivers of income shifting influence each other.
6.3. Extended model results including multiple interactions
8 shows the results of estimating the extended model in-
cluding multiple interactions. Regressions (1) and (2) in-
clude the capital and intangibles interaction continuously
specified, and regressions (3) and (4) include all interaction
terms categorically specified. Regression (1) and (3) each in-
clude all interaction terms, whereas regressions (2) and (4)
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Table 8: Extended model results including multiple interactions
Notes. Regressions (1) and (2) include continuous capital and intangibles interactions. Regression (1) includes all interactions and (2) includes only significant
interactions. Regressions (3) and (4) include categorical capital and intangibles interactions. (3) includes all interactions and (4) includes only significant
interactions. Regression (1) is the preferred regression. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote significance on the 10, 5, 1% significance level. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis
and standard errors are clustered at the subsidiary level to control for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation Hoechle (2007, 285). Source: own table.
Subsidiary-fixed effects, panel 2007-2015, dependent variable: ln EBIT, Πi t
Specification Continuous interactions Categorical interactions
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln GDP per capita, (Ai t) 0.219 0.219∗ 0.238 0.228∗
(1.240) (1.651) (1.349) (1.714)
ln fixed assets, (Ki t) 0.136∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
(5.159) (5.987)
ln cost of employees, (Li t) 0.458∗∗∗ 0.464∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗
(10.768) (13.605) (11.525) (14.461)
Tax differential, (τi t) 9.788∗∗∗ 6.318∗∗∗ 0.882 1.104
(3.039) (2.842) (0.564) (1.145)
Capital interaction, (cont., τi t × Ki t) −0.612∗∗∗ −0.407∗∗∗
(−3.228) (−3.299)
ln fixed assets, (cat., K_di t) 0.286
∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗
(3.533) (3.828)
Capital interaction, (cat., τi t × K_di t) −2.273∗∗∗ −1.765∗∗∗
(−3.336) (−3.316)
ln intangible assets, (Ii t) −0.004
(−0.390)
Intangible interaction, (cont., τi t × Ii t) −0.027
(−0.273)
ln intangible assets, (cat., I_di t) 0.002
(0.043)
Intangibles interaction, (cat., τi t × I_di t) −0.251
(−0.549)
2nd ownership interaction, (OW_100i t) −3.613∗∗∗ −2.639∗∗∗ −3.070∗∗∗ −2.173∗∗∗
(−3.349) (−2.590) (−2.885) (−2.202)
1st ownership interaction, (OW_51i t) 0.314 −0.536 0.425 −0.316
(0.190) (−0.345) (0.273) (−0.211)
Shifting direction, (Case2i t) 0.051 0.063
(0.630) (0.773)
Direction interaction, (τi t × Case2i t) 1.333 1.980
(0.704) (1.048)
Year dummies p p p p
Industry-year dummies p p p p
No. of observations 17’897 26’869 17’897 26’869
No. of subsidiaries 3’698 4’862 3’698 4’862
Within R2 0.066 0.067 0.064 0.065
Overall F -test 16.752 28.072 15.433 25.823
only include interaction terms that entered significantly in re-
gressions (1) and (3), respectively. Regression (1) shows the
results of estimating equation (13) on the sample from 1 and
constitutes the preferred regression. The coefficient of the
tax differential is significantly positive while the coefficient
of the capital interaction is significantly negative. Hence, the
theory of fixed costs associated with income shifting is sup-
ported. The coefficient of the intangibles interaction is not
significant anymore and the significance of the coefficients
of the two ownership interaction terms remains unchanged.
The coefficient of the direction interaction remains insignifi-
cant. Marginal effects for this extended model can be calcu-
lated using 11. Since this model allows to calculate numer-
ous marginal effects for subsidiaries with different character-
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istics, it is mainly relied on graphics to interpret the shifting
behavior of Swiss MNEs. 8 shows the marginal effect of the
tax differential for wholly-owned subsidiaries with shifting
direction to the parent. Note that the variables OW_51i t ,
OW_100i t and Case2i t shift the plane along the vertical axis,
depending on the value they take. For example, switching
OW_100i t from 0 to 1 lowers the plane by 3.613 units ce-
teris paribus, which is equal to the coefficient estimate of
OW_100i t . Thus, the marginal effect is in absolute terms by
3.613 larger for wholly-owned subsidiaries than it is for sub-
sidiaries with an ownership share between 10 and 50.99%. 8
shows that intangible assets are less important in explaining
differences in income shifting patterns than is the scale of op-
erations. The marginal effect barely varies with the amount
of intangibles, possibly because the informational value of
intangibles is nested within fixed assets. This finding con-
tradicts several recent studies examining the effect of intan-
gibles on income shifting.31 Among the papers reviewed in
2, only Beer and Loeprick (2015, 436-438) take into account
that a size effect potentially affects the extent of income shift-
ing. When including an interaction of the tax differential and
the logarithm of the MNE’s total assets, their intangibles in-
teraction remains significant. However, the intangible assets
are measured at the subsidiary level while the size is mea-
sured at the MNE level, thus the authors lack consistency of
measurement across the variables.
9 highlights how ownership and the shifting direction af-
fect the marginal effect of the tax differential in regression
(1). The top and bottom row show the marginal effect for
subsidiaries with Case2i t = 1, respectively with Case2i t = 0.
The intangible asset endowment is fixed at ln intangible fixed
assets = 11 (roughly the sample mean) for all effects. Signif-
icant income shifting is present whenever the upper bound
of the CI is below the zero-line. The marginal effects are
practically relevant over the range indicated by the grey bar
Berry et al. (2012, 661). Both conditions are met only for
wholly-owned subsidiaries with sufficiently large ln fixed as-
sets (the top and bottom left graphs). 9 suggests that the
ownership share explains more variability in income shifting
patterns than the direction of income shifting (the difference
between semi-elasticities is larger across the columns of the
graphs than it is across the rows). This is not surprising given
the coefficient estimates and their significance in regression
(1) in 8. The results from regression (1) in 8 support the
theories that the scale of operations and the ownership share
influence the extent of income shifting, but reject that intan-
gible assets and the direction of income shifting affect the
extent of income shifting significantly. Regression (2) in 8
excludes the insignificant interactions and associated stan-
dalone terms. Doing so changes the magnitude of the re-
maining interaction terms slightly, but does not affect signs
and significances. In regression (2), the marginal effects of
the tax differential for subsidiaries with mean ln fixed assets
are −1.995∗∗∗ for wholly-owned subsidiaries, 0.108 for sub-
31Additional comments on the implications of the intangibles interaction
in 8 are deferred to 7.3
sidiaries with an ownership share between 51 and 99.99%
and 0.644 for subsidiaries with an ownership share between
10 and 50.99%.
Regressions (3) and (4) replicate the analysis from re-
gressions (1) and (2) using categorical instead of continu-
ous specifications for the interaction terms, analogous to the
analysis in 7. All previous conclusions drawn remain valid
using categorical variables for the capital and intangibles in-
teraction. Using categorical specifications simplifies interpre-
tation and visualization of marginal effects, at the costs of
a reduced level of detail. The marginal effects from regres-
sion (3) are shown in 10. The marginal effects are significant
whenever the error bar does not cross the zero-line. This is
the case for wholly-owned subsidiaries with above mean ln
fixed assets, regardless of the value of the other variables. Ad-
ditionally, subsidiaries with below mean ln fixed assets, but
above mean ln intangible fixed assets and shifting direction
to the parent show borderline significance. 10 confirms the
insight from 8,9, that the ownership share and the scale of
operations explain most variation in income shifting behav-
ior of Swiss MNEs. Especially the amount of intangible as-
sets is largely irrelevant for explaining differences in income
shifting patterns (the difference between the marginal effects
depicted by • and is minute). Further, these conclusions re-
main valid after excluding the insignificant interaction terms
in regression (4).
The main results are equal across all regressions in 8.
Particularly, using continuous and categorical specifications
for the interaction terms does not lead to differing conclu-
sions. The scale of operations and the ownership share play
a dominant role in explaining differences in income shift-
ing behavior of Swiss MNEs.32 Specifically, the results from
the preferred regression (1) indicate that the marginal ef-
fect changes by −0.612 when ln fixed assets are increased
by 1, and that the marginal effect is by −3.613 larger (in
absolute terms) for wholly-owned subsidiaries compared
to subsidiaries with an ownership share between 10 and
50.99%. The corresponding semi-elasticity from regression
(1) for wholly-owned subsidiaries with mean ln fixed and
intangible fixed assets and shifting direction to the parent
is −1.322∗. Evaluating the marginal effect from regression
(2) at the sample mean of ln fixed assets yields −1.995∗∗∗
for wholly-owned subsidiaries. All regressions support the
idea of fixed costs and suggest that the amount of intangible
assets is of minor importance once the scale of operations
is considered. Almost only wholly-owned subsidiaries shift
income. The impact of the shifting direction is modest as
suggested by 9,10, however, the result from 6.2 concerning
the shifting direction and industry-specific shifting behavior
should be kept in mind.
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Figure 9: 2D Marginal effect of the tax differential in regression (1) in 8. ln intangible fixed assets are fixed at 11. The solid
line shows the marginal effect according to the partial derivative of regression (1) from 8, and the shaded area represents the
90% confidence interval. The grey bar indicates the range of the middle 90% of the distribution of ln fixed assets (observations
between the 5th and 95th percentile). Source: own figure, based on Berry et al. (2012, 661).
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● above mean ln intang., shifting to parent above mean ln intang., shifting to sub.
below mean ln intang., shifting to parent below mean ln intang., shifting to sub.
Figure 10: Marginal effect of the tax differential in regression (3) in 8. The symbols •,Î, and + represent the marginal effect
according to the partial derivative of regression (3) in Table 8, and the grey error bars represent 90% confidence intervals.
Percentages indicate the approximate fraction of the sample belonging to each category. Source: own figure.
6.4. Summary of marginal effects
9 presents an overview of semi-elasticities from the dif-
ferent models presented throughout 6, 7, 8. Panel A shows
the semi-elasticities estimated using different variations of
the basic model. Panels B and C show the semi-elasticities
estimated using the extended model including single and
32The same comments as in footnote 31 apply. Interpreting the ownership
interactions is only valid given that the estimates in 8 are not biased because
of the exclusion of the ownership variables as standalone terms. See 8 for
additional comments.
multiple interactions, and Panel D shows semi-elasticities
from related studies presented in the literature review. The
benchmark estimate A.1 is smaller than the comparison from
Hines and Rice (1994), which is not surprising since var-
ious authors mention that using affiliate-level data rather
than aggregated data results in lower estimates of the semi-
elasticity Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013, 15, 18), Dharma-
pala (2014, 431). Other than in Hines and Rice (1994, 163),
the quadratic tax term is economically irrelevant here (the
estimates A.2-A.4 are similar). The semi-elasticity estimated
by Huizinga and Laeven (2008) is larger than the estimate
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Table 9: Summary of semi-elasticities from 6.1,6.2, 6.3
Notes. The semi-elasticities are calculated according to the partial derivative of the regression outputs in 6, 7, 8, respectively the mentioned papers. aThe
significance can not be assessed. Sample statistics can be found in 2. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote significance on the 10, 5, 1% significance level. Source: own table.
Number Subsidiary characteristics τi t Ki t/K_di t Ii t OW_51i t OW_100i t Case2i t Estimate
Panel A: Basic model, 6
(A.1) Regression (2), benchmark - - - - - - −1.458∗∗∗
(A.2) Regression (4) 25th perc. - - - - - −1.481∗∗∗
(A.3) Regression (4) Mean - - - - - −1.444∗∗∗
(A.4) Regression (4) 75th perc. - - - - - −1.407∗
Panel B: Extended model including single drivers of income shifting, 7
(B.1) Regression (1) - 25th perc. - - - - −0.525
(B.2) Regression (1) - Mean - - - - −1.187∗∗∗
(B.3) Regression (1) - 75th perc. - - - - −1.834∗∗∗
(B.4) Regression (3) - - 25th perc. - - - −0.477
(B.5) Regression (3) - - Mean - - - −0.808
(B.6) Regression (3) - - 75th perc. - - - −1.127∗∗
(B.7) Regression (6) - - - 0 0 - −0.233
(B.8) Regression (6) - - - 1 0 - −0.318
(B.9) Regression (6) - - - 0 1 - −2.101∗∗∗
(B.10) Regression (7) - - - - - 0 −1.330
(B.11) Regression (7) - - - - - 1 −1.509∗∗∗
Panel C: Extended model including multiple drivers of income shifting, 8
(C.1) Regression (1), preferred - Mean Mean 0 1 1 −1.322∗
(C.2) Regression (2) - Mean - 0 0 - 0.645
(C.3) Regression (2) - Mean - 1 0 - 0.108
(C.4) Regression (2) - Mean - 0 1 - −1995∗∗∗
(C.5) Regression (4) - 1 - 0 0 - −0.661
(C.6) Regression (4) - 1 - 1 0 - −0.977
(C.7) Regression (4) - 1 - 0 1 - −2.834∗∗∗
(C.8) Regression (4) - 0 - 0 0 - 1.104
(C.9) Regression (4) - 0 - 1 0 - −0.788
(C.10) Regression (4) - 0 - 0 1 - −1.069∗
Panel D: Comparison with prior literature from 2 and consensus estimate, 8
(A.1) Hines and Rice (1994, 163), Table 2, column (2), OLS cross-section 1982 −2.250∗∗∗
(A.1) Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013, 22-23), consensus estimate −0.820a
(B.2) Huizinga and Laeven (2008, 1177), Table 6, column (1), OLS cross-section 1999 −1.766
(B.5) Beer and Loeprick (2015, 435), Table 2, column (2), mean intangibles, FE panel 2003-2011 −0.980∗∗∗
(B.9) Dischinger (2008, 26), Table 6, column (5), wholly-owned subsidiaries, OLS cross-section 2004 −1.551a
(B.11) Dischinger et al. (2014, 258), Table 3, column (2), shifting to parent, FE panel 1995-2007 −1.148
B.2, however, the tax incentive variable they use is a product
of two terms, and hence the difference in the estimates could
stem from different model specifications. Heckemeyer and
Overesch (2013, 18) find that the semi-elasticities decrease
over time, possibly as a result of the introduction of specific
tax law deterring income shifting. Accordingly, the time dif-
ference in the datasets could be responsible for the lower
estimate. Beer and Loeprick (2015) find a slightly larger
semi-elasticity than the estimate B.5, but their approach
raises concerns about variable measurement.33 Dischinger
(2008)finds a lower semi-elasticity for wholly-owned firms
than the estimate B.9. Different estimation methods might
give rise to this difference. Dischinger et al. (2014) present
a smaller semi-elasticity than B.11 using a sample of Euro-
33The concerns about the intangibles interaction in this thesis are dis-
cussed in 7.3.
pean MNEs. Their approach is largely identical to the one
applied here, hence the larger estimate probably indicates
a larger extent of income shifting among Swiss MNEs. The
semi-elasticities from 9, specifically the benchmark estimate
of −1.458∗∗∗ and the preferred estimate of −1.322∗ are large
compared to the discussion in Dharmapala (2014, 431-432)
and the consensus estimate of −0.82 provided by Hecke-
meyer and Overesch (2013, 22-23), possibly because Swiss
MNEs face more tax saving opportunities than otherwise
similar European MNEs, and thus shift more income.
6.5. Robustness
The results presented in 6.1,6.2,6.3 are verified in a series
of robustness tests. 10 provides robustness tests for the basic
model, using the benchmark regression (2) from 6 as a refer-
ence point. 11 provides robustness tests for the extended
model including single interaction terms, and 12 presents
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Table 10: Robustness tests for the basic model
Notes. All regressions are based on regression (2) from 6 with the following modifications. Regression (1) uses P/L before tax as the dependent variable.
Regression (2) uses different production inputs. Regression (3) expands the sample to NACE industries A-I (see Appendix B.1). Regression (4) includes only
majority-owned subsidiaries. Regression (5) uses the local tax rate instead of the tax differential. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote significance on the 10, 5, 1% significance
level. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis and standard errors are clustered at the subsidiary level to control for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation
Hoechle (2007, 285). Source: own table.
Subsidiary-fixed effects, panel 2007-2015, dependent variable: ln EBIT, Πi t , except (1): P/L before tax
Variation P/L before tax Prod. inputs Industries Majority Tax Rate
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln GDP per capita, (Ai t) 0.279∗ 0.596∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗ 0.360∗∗ 0.235∗
(1.907) (4.025) (1.981) (2.401) (1.762)
ln fixed assets, (Ki t) 0.067∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗
(4.863) (5.747) (4.663) (5.096)
ln cost of employees, (Li t) 0.465∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗ 0.456∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗
(12.876) (14.198) (11.840) (13.553)
ln tangible fixed assets, (TKi t) 0.097∗∗∗
(5.912)
ln number of employees, (L_Ni t) 0.406
(11.146)
Tax differential, (τi t) −1.267∗∗∗ −1.782∗∗∗ −1.263∗∗∗ −1.797∗∗∗
(−2.612) (−3.778) (−3.132) (−3.626)
Local tax rate, (ri t) −1.458∗∗∗
(−3.390)
Year dummies p p p p p
Industry-year dummies p p p p p
No. of observations 25’919 22’188 31’164 22’084 26’869
No. of subsidiaries 4’813 4’327 5’749 4’044 40862
Within R2 0.057 0.057 0.063 0.066 0.066
Overall F -test 29.639 29.050 10.822 25.714 31.386
robustness tests for the extended model including multiple
interaction terms. In regression (1) of 10 the EBIT is re-
placed by P/L before tax as the dependent variable. The
coefficient of the tax differential is lower than in regression
(1) of 6, which is against expectations based on Heckemeyer
and Overesch (2013, 10), who state that the EBIT is affected
by income shifting through transfer pricing and royalty pay-
ments but not financial shifting techniques. Marques and
Pinho (2016, 720?21) are confronted with a similar case but
do not provide an explanation.34
The result from regression (1) suggests that not all shift-
ing techniques are used to shift income in the same direc-
tion, and that the underlying shifting incentive might be more
complex than the mere tax differential between countries.
The production factors fixed assets and costs of employees
are replaced with tangible fixed assets and the number of em-
ployees in regression (2), resulting in a larger coefficient esti-
mate of the tax differential of −1.782. Expanding the indus-
tries to the NACE sectors A-I in regression (3) yields a lower
coefficient of −1.263. The reduced estimate could be a fur-
34Compare columns (1) and (4) as well as column (3) and (6) in Table 9
on page 720.
ther indication of industry-specific shifting behavior. Regres-
sion (4) considers only subsidiaries with an ownership share
of 51% or more. Unsurprisingly, the coefficient estimate of
the tax differential is larger, reflecting that majority-owned
subsidiaries engage in income shifting activities to a larger
extent than non majority-owned subsidiaries. Regression (5)
replaces the tax differential with the local tax rate at the sub-
sidiary’s location, showing that with all parent firms facing
the same tax rate, it is computationally irrelevant whether the
tax differential or the local tax rate of the subsidiary is used.
The coefficient estimates and corresponding t-statistics are
identical to the numbers presented in regression (2) of 6.35
However, the interpretation of a change in the tax incentive
variable is slightly different. In case a tax differential is used,
a change in the shifting incentive can be attributed to either
a change in the tax rate of the subsidiary, the parent firm or
both. By using the local tax rate of the subsidiary only, a
35Calculating the tax differential as τi t = (ri t − rht ) constitutes a variable
transformation which does not affect the coefficient estimates. This is the
case because the parent tax rate rht is the same for all observations for any
given year. This argument does not apply to studies using samples with
parent firms from multiple countries.
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Table 11: Robustness tests for the extended model including single interactions
Notes. Regressions (1), (2), (3) and (4) correspond to regressions (1), (3), (6) and (7) from 7 and add leverage and GDP growth as additional control
variables.. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote significance on the 10, 5, 1% significance level. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis and standard errors are clustered at the
subsidiary level to control for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation Hoechle (2007, 285). Source: own table.
Subsidiary-fixed effects, panel 2007-2015, dependent variable: ln EBIT, Πi t
Income shifting driver Capital (cont.) Intang. (cont.) Ownership Direction
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln GDP per capita, (Ai t) 0.202 0.241 0.219 0.207
(1.506) (1.417) (1.639) (1.506)
ln fixed assets, (Ki t) 0.094∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(6.069) (4.331) (5.276) (5.281)
ln cost of employees, (Li t) 0.466∗∗∗ 0.454∗∗∗ 0.466∗∗∗ 0.466∗∗∗
(13.511) (10.630) (13.453) (13.454)
Leverage, ln debt over ln total assets, (LEVi t) −0.257∗∗∗ −0.365∗∗∗ −0.253∗∗∗ −0.254∗∗∗
(−8.350) (−9.378) (−8.224) (−8.251)
GDP growth, (GDP_Gi t) 0.019∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
(4.707) (4.689) (4.578) (4.634)
Tax differential, (τi t) 4.418∗∗ 1.475 −0.076 −0.909
(2.382) (1.283) (−0.095) (−0.687)
Capital interaction, (cont., τi t × Ki t) −0.377∗∗∗
(−3.098)
ln intangible assets, (Ii t) 0.012
(1.246)
Intangible interaction, (cont., τi t × Ii t) −0.177
(−2.050)
2nd ownership interaction, (OW_100i t) −1.583∗
(−1.670)
1st ownership interaction, (OW_51i t) −0.329
(−0.225)
Shifting direction, (Case2i t) 0.006
(0.100)
Direction interaction, (τi t × Case2i t) −0.301
(−0.203)
Year dummies p p p p
Industry-year dummies p p p p
No. of observations 26’577 17’680 26’577 26’577
No. of subsidiaries 4’818 3’659 4’818 4’818
Within R2 0.074 0.076 0.074 0.074
Overall F -test 32.160 22.331 30.233 30.171
change in the tax rate of the parent firm is irrelevant for in-
terpretation, thus using the tax rate instead of the tax differ-
ential probably reflects reality less accurate. The robustness
tests in 10 show that the conclusions from the basic model of
income shifting remain unchanged for various modifications
of the estimation approach.
11 takes up the regressions (1), (3), (6) and (7) from 7
and adds frequently used control variables. The additional
variables are the leverage of the subsidiary, measured as ln
debt over ln total assets, and GDP growth. The leverage en-
ters significantly negative in all regressions, suggesting that
a higher leverage is associated with a lower EBIT. This is not
intuitive, since the EBIT is independent of interest payments.
Huizinga and Laeven (2008, 1174) find the same result and
argue that leverage could make profitable investments more
difficult to finance. They also find that leverage has a more
pronounced influence when the P/L before tax is used instead
of the EBIT, which is a more intuitive result Huizinga and
Laeven (2008, 1174). The GDP growth enters significantly
positive in all regressions, indicating that higher GDP growth
is associated with a higher EBIT. The robustness tests in 11
do not lead to changes of signs and significances of the coef-
ficient estimates of the tax differential and interaction terms.
Hence, all conclusions drawn from the extended model us-
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Table 12: Robustness tests for the extended model including multiple interactions
Notes. All regressions are based on regression (2) from 8 with the following modifications. Regression (1) includes leverage and GDP growth as additional
control variables. Regression (2) uses P/L before tax as the dependent variable. Regression (3) uses different production inputs. Regression (4) expands the
sample to NACE industries A-I (see Appendix B.1). ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote significance on the 10, 5, 1% significance level. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis
and standard errors are clustered at the subsidiary level to control for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation Hoechle (2007, 285). Source: own table.
Subsidiary-fixed effects, panel 2007-2015, dependent variable: ln EBIT, Πi t , except (2): P/L before tax
Variation Add. controls P/L before tax Prod. inputs Industries
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln GDP per capita, (Ai t) 0.200 0.263∗ 0.595∗∗∗ 0.236∗
(1.501) (1.812) (4.053) (1.873)
ln fixed assets, (Ki t) 0.099∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗
(6.276) (5.958) (6.605)
ln cost of employees, (Li t) 0.465∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗∗
(13.517) (12.908) (14.207)
Leverage, ln debt over ln total assets, (LEVi t) −0.256∗∗∗
(−8.326)
GDP growth, (GDP_Gi t) 0.018
(4.624)
ln tangible fixed assets, (TKi t) 0.120∗∗∗
(6.011)
ln number of employees, (L_Ni t) 0.406∗∗∗
(11.217)
Tax differential, (τi t) 6.923∗∗∗ 6.221∗∗ 4.384∗ 6.156∗∗
(3.119) (2.537) (1.727) (2.885)
Capital interaction, (cont., τi t × Ki t) −4.34∗∗∗ −0.451∗∗∗ −0.414∗∗∗
(3.522) (−3.245) (−3.543)
2nd ownership interaction, (OW_100i t) −2.422∗∗ −1.132 −2.531∗ −2.040∗∗
(−2.407) (−1.003) (−2.213) (−2.092)
1st ownership interaction, (OW_51i t) −0.800 −1.070 0.414 −0.238
(−0.518) (−0.553) (0.245) (−0.178)
Capital interaction, (cont., τi t × TKi t) −0.313∗∗
(−2.239)
Year dummies p p p p
Industry-year dummies p p p p
No. of observations 26’577 25’919 22’188 31’164
No. of subsidiaries 4’818 4’813 4’327 5’749
Within R2 0.075 0.057 0.058 0.064
Overall F -test 29.814 26.358 25.770 10.613
ing single interactions in 6.2 remain valid after controlling
for leverage and GDP growth. However, including the addi-
tional controls reduces the marginal effect of the tax differ-
ential. The semi-elasticity in regression (1) of 11 is −0.838∗
for subsidiaries with mean ln fixed assets, whereas the same
marginal effect is −1.187∗∗∗ in regression (1) of 7. This is in
line with Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013, 18), who find in
a meta-study of 25 income shifting papers, that controlling
for leverage reduces the impact of the tax differential.
12 provides results from robustness tests of the extended
model including multiple interactions. All four regressions
are based on regression (2) in 8. The same variations as in
10 are estimated. Regression (1) includes the additional con-
trol variables leverage and GDP growth, regression (2) uses
the P/L before tax as the dependent variable instead of the
EBIT, in regression (3) the fixed assets and the costs of em-
ployees are replaced by tangible fixed assets and the number
of employees, and finally regression (4) expands the sample
to the NACE main sectors A-I. Including the additional con-
trol variables does not alter the significance of the tax dif-
ferential or the interaction terms, but renders the coefficient
of the GDP per capita insignificant. This might be the result
of collinearity between GDP per capita and GDP growth, in
which case it would be sufficient to include one of the two
variables. The marginal effect for wholly-owned subsidiaries
at the sample mean of ln fixed assets is −1.550∗∗∗. Replacing
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Figure 11: Income shifting patterns over time. The left and right graphs show the marginal effect of the tax differential using
a continuous and a categorical specification. The solid line shows the marginal effect according to the partial derivatives
of regressions (1) and (2) in 13, and the shaded area represents the 90% confidence interval. Percentages indicate the
approximate fraction of observations that fall into each year. Source: own figure.
the EBIT with P/L before tax in regression (2) renders the
coefficient of OW_100i t insignificant. The marginal effect
for subsidiaries with the characteristics described above is
−1.199∗∗, and both effects for non wholly-owned subsidiaries
are not significant. This pattern of results is also observed in
regressions (4) and (7) of 7, and the comments in Appendix
D.2 apply equivalently. Replacing the production function
inputs in regression (3) does not lead to changes in signs or
significances of the interaction terms. The marginal effect for
subsidiaries with the characteristics above is −2.366∗∗∗. Ex-
panding the industries in regression (4) results in a marginal
effect of −1.656∗∗∗ for wholly-owned subsidiaries with mean
ln fixed assets. As proposed earlier in this subsection and
in 6.2, the lower marginal effect in regression (4) could in-
dicate that the income shifting behavior of Swiss MNEs de-
pends on the industry-affiliation. These four semi-elasticities
correspond to the marginal effect in regression (2) from 8,
which is equal to −1.995∗∗∗ for subsidiaries with the same
characteristics. The extended model using multiple income
shifting drivers is robust to the estimation variations applied
in 12.
7 contains a discussion about how the income shifting
behavior of Swiss MNEs developed over time and which lo-
cations play important roles within income shifting strategies
of Swiss MNEs. As mentioned in the introduction, recent re-
search is often concerned with the effectiveness of various
tax legislations Beuselinck et al. (2015). Lohse and Riedel
(2012, 1) mention that various countries have recently in-
troduced TP legislation aimed at reducing income shifting
among MNEs. Against this background, it seems fruitful to
address the above mentioned issues for the following rea-
sons. First, examining how income shifting patterns devel-
oped over time could provide insights on the effectiveness of
tax legislations, and secondly, examining locations involved
in income shifting strategies might provide guidance in de-
signing new tax legislation aimed at deterring the extent of
income shifting. For simplicity, the discussion is based on the
basic model in the benchmark regression (2) of 6. Addition-
ally, 7.3 summarizes implications for future research.
7. Discussion
7.1. Did income shifting decrease over time?
Lohse and Riedel (2012, 10, 23) use a linear time trend to
assess changes in income shifting behavior and find that in-
come shifting decreased over their sample period, suggesting
that TP regulations indeed reduce the extent of income shift-
ing among European MNEs. However, since negative and
positive changes offset each other, modeling a linear time
trend provides only limited insights into changes in income
shifting patterns. Therefore, an alternative approach using
interaction terms consisting of the tax differential and yearly
categorical variables is additionally applied. The results of
both approaches are presented in 13 and the corresponding
marginal effects are plotted in 11. Regression (1) includes a
linear time trend using calendar years as a continuous vari-
able. The negative coefficient of the time trend implies that
the EBIT decreased significantly over the sample period. The
marginal effect of the tax differential in the left graph of 11
suggests that income shifting decreased slightly over time,
moreover, it indicates that Swiss MNEs did not shift income
during the last sample years 2014 and 2015. Other than in
Lohse and Riedel (2012, 10), the coefficient estimate of the
interaction term in regression (1) is not significant. Regres-
sion (2) provides a more detailed insight into how income
shifting among Swiss MNEs has changed over time.
In regression (2), the coefficient of the tax differential
depicts the marginal effect for all observations in the year
2007. An isolated interpretation is therefore useful. During
the year 2007, an increase in the tax differential by 1 per-
centage point is associated with a decrease in the EBIT of
1.524%. The right graph in 11 shows how the semi-elasticity
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Figure 12: income shifting across geographic regions. Marginal effects of the tax differential across different regions in the
world and Europe. Black dots represent the marginal effects according to the partial derivative of regression (1) and (2) in
14, and grey error bars represent 90% confidence intervals. Percentages indicate the approximate fraction of observations
that falls into each region. Source: own figure.
developed over time. It dropped significantly to −2.549∗∗∗
in 2008, but is not significantly different from the level in
2007 in later years. Further, the right graph in 11 does not
suggest that income shifting disappeared in the latest sample
years. A possible explanation for the large extent of income
shifting in 2008 is the following. Many companies experi-
enced losses during the financial crisis. Income shifted to a
loss-making affiliate is taxed at 0% up to the extent of the
losses of that affiliate, and hence the tax incentive to shift in-
come is larger than the tax differential because the ETR of at
least part of the shifted income is smaller than the statutory
CITR. This argument further implies that loss carry-forwards
change the shifting incentive Overesch (2009, 9-10) (8 elab-
orates). To conclude, income shifting among Swiss MNEs did
not decrease over time, but rather remained constant in the
last sample years.
7.2. Are income shifting patterns different across the globe?
Huizinga and Laeven (2008, 1173) include an interaction
term consisting of the weighted tax differential and a categor-
ical variable equal to 1 for firms located in Eastern Europe.
Doing so allows the semi-elasticity of the EBIT to vary across
geographic regions. This method is adopted in regressions
(1) and (2) in 14. Regression (1) includes four categorical
variables depicting the world region the subsidiary falls into
(Africa, Americas, Asia, Europe, and Oceania). Each cate-
gorical variable being equal to 1 if the subsidiary is located in
that region and Africa being the reference category. The same
approach is used in regression (2) with more detailed regions
within Europe (Northern, Southern, Western and Eastern Eu-
rope as the reference category). The sample is therefore re-
stricted to European subsidiaries of Swiss MNEs. The results
from regression (1) are visualized in 12 on the left, suggest-
ing that significant income shifting occurs between the parent
firm in Switzerland and subsidiaries located in the Americas,
Europe and Oceania. The marginal effects of the tax differ-
ential are −9.537∗∗∗ for subsidiaries located in the Americas,
−1.661∗∗∗ for European subsidiaries and −17.941∗∗∗ for sub-
sidiaries in Oceania. However, due to the low number of ob-
servations in the Americas and Oceania, the estimates are in-
accurate (indicated by the wide CIs). Using only observations
of European subsidiaries favors the use of smaller geographic
regions.
The marginal effect of the tax differential from regression
(2) is plotted in the right graph of 12. The semi-elasticities
for Northern and Western Europe are −2.728∗∗∗ respectively
−1.234∗, and both significant. In other words, an increase of
1 percentage point in the tax differential is associated with a
decrease in the EBIT of 2.728% for subsidiaries in northern
Europe and 1.234% for subsidiaries in Western Europe. No
income shifting occurs between the Swiss parent firm and
subsidiaries located in Eastern or Southern Europe. This is
not surprising since the tax rates in Eastern and Southern
Europe are lower than in Northern and Western Europe, but
very similar to the Swiss CITR (see 4 in 5.2).
7.3. Implications for future research
Besides bringing up results to address the thesis objec-
tives in 1.2, the empirical analysis has brought forward sev-
eral implications relevant to future research and tax policy.
Most important among these is the threshold of fixed assets,
that needs to be reached in order for a MNE to benefit from
income shifting. 7 illustrates this point well. Dharmapala
(2014, 445) mentions very generally, that heterogeneity in
MNEs’ corporate structure, and hence in shifting behavior,
can be viewed as consistent with fixed costs associated with
income shifting. The results presented in 6.2, 6.3 strongly
suggest that Swiss MNEs face fixed costs when shifting in-
come and there is no obvious a priori reason to assume this
is not the case for other MNEs. However, the results here pro-
vide a mere indication of fixed costs, the size and the cause
thereof are to be studied in future research efforts.
An unexpected result is the low impact of intangible as-
sets on income shifting behavior. While Beer and Loeprick
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Table 13: Income shifting patterns over time
Notes. Regression (1) includes a time interaction with a continuous time
variable. Regression (2) includes time interactions with yearly categori-
cal variables. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote significance on the 10, 5, 1% significance
level. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis and standard errors are clus-
tered at the subsidiary level to control for heteroscedasticity and autocorre-
lation Hoechle (2007, 285). aThe coefficient of the tax differential is much
larger than in previous specification. This is the result of including the the
time trend as calendar years instead of using integers 1-9 as done in Lohse
and Riedel (2012). Since this a linear variable transformation, the marginal
effect is unaffected. Source: own table.
Subsidiary-fixed effects, panel 2007-2015, dep. var.: ln EBIT, Πi t
Time trend Continuous Categorical
Explanatory variables (1) (2)
Year, (cont., T_CYi t) −0.033∗∗∗
(−4.035)
ln GDP per capita, (Ai t) 0.519
∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗
(3.606) (2.178)
ln fixed assets, (Ki t) 0.064
∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(5.218) (5.071)
ln cost of employees, (Li t) 0.486
∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗
(14.255) (13.564)
Tax differential, (τi t) −173.913a −1.524∗∗∗
(1.530) (3.330)
Time interaction 0.086
(cont., τi t× Year) (1.520)
τi t × 2008 −1.025∗∗∗
(−2.858)
τi t × 2009 −0.544
(−1.318)
τi t × 2010 0.287
(0.675)
τi t × 2011 0.020
(0.049)
τi t × 2012 0.481
(1.098)
τi t × 2013 0.143
(0.313)
τi t × 2014 0.103
(0.225)
τi t × 2015 0.184
(0.383)
Year dummies p
Industry-year dummies p p
No. of observations 26’869 26’869
No. of subsidiaries 4’862 4’862
Within R2 0.057 0.067
Overall F -test 56.095 23.121
(2015, 435) and Dischinger and Riedel (2011, 706) find that
the intangible assets of the subsidiary significantly impact in-
come shifting, the results in 6.3 suggest that intangible as-
sets are unrelated to the extent of income shifting once the
capital interaction is included in the model. This is especially
surprising considering the large empirical evidence on the re-
lation between tax rates and intangibles, including recent evi-
dence stemming from very different research approaches (for
example Karkinsky and Riedel (2012, 185), who find that
MNEs preferably locate patents in low-tax affiliates). Hence,
it is unwise to conclude that the results shown here nullify
previous research. It is rather stressed to choose a sensible
approach when studying how intangible assets and firm size
affect income shifting. One such approach is to use the ratio
of intangible fixed assets over fixed assets. Since the variable
fixed assets used here includes intangible fixed assets, at least
part of the significant effect of the capital interaction can be
traced back to intangible assets.
The analysis of the shifting direction in 6.2 suggests, that
the income shifting behavior of Swiss MNEs depends on the
industry-affiliation. The evidence provided here is of anec-
dotal nature only and the detailed study of industry-related
income shifting behavior is left to future research. Further,
the discussion in 7.1 indicates that against expectations, in-
come shifting among Swiss MNEs did not decrease over time.
This is surprising since many authors describe a general trend
of intensification of tax laws within Europe and as a conse-
quence, report significant reductions in income shifting ac-
Table 14: Income shifting across geographic regions
Notes. Regression (1) includes geographic interactions with four categorical
variables. Americas_di t , Asia_di t , Europe_di t and Oceania_di t , each being
equal to 1, if the observation falls into that region and 0 otherwise. Regres-
sion (2) includes geographic interactions with three categorical variables
Northern_Europe_di t , Southern_Europe_di t , and Western_Europe_di t , each
being equal to 1 if the observation falls into that region and 0 otherwise. The
United Nations region classification used to assign countries to geographic
regions can be found in Appendix C.2. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote significance on the
10, 5, 1% significance level. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis and stan-
dard errors are clustered at the subsidiary level to control for heteroscedas-
ticity and autocorrelation Hoechle (2007, 285). Source: own table.
Subsidiary-fixed effects, panel 2007-2015, dep. var.: ln EBIT, Πi t
Geographic regions Worldwide Europe
Explanatory variables (1) (2)
ln GDP per capita, (Ai t) 0.244
∗ 0.230
(1.794) (1.381)
ln fixed assets. (Ki t) 0.063
∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(5.086) (4.915)
ln cost of employees, (Li t) 0.466
∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗
(13.553) (13.235)
Tax differential, (τi t) −0.913 −0.636
(−1.211) (−0.428)
τi t× Americas_di t −8.624∗∗∗
(−2.649)
τi t× Asia_di t 2.152
(1.524)
τi t× Europe_di t −0.748
(−0.842)
τi t× Oceania_di t −17.028∗∗∗
(−2.976)
τi t× Northern_Europe_di t −2.089
(−1.180)
τi t× Southern_Europe_di t −0.606
(−0.328)
τi t× Western_Europe_di t −0.598
(−0.364)
Year dummies p p
Industry-year dummies p p
No. of observations 26’869 25’745
No. of subsidiaries 4’862 4’607
Within R2 0.066 0.067
Overall F -test 26.453 26.949
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tivities Lohse et al. (for example 2012, 23-24), Marques and
Pinho (2016, 729). The income shifting activities of Swiss
MNEs would have been expected to decrease since a large
fraction of subsidiaries is located within Europe, and thus af-
fected by stricter tax law. This seemingly contradictory find-
ing leads one to assume, that income shifting is most effec-
tively deterred by tightening tax law in the host country of the
parent firm. Hence, relevant tax law in Switzerland needs
to be adjusted to effectively deter income shifting among
Swiss MNEs. This find- ing in conjuncture with industry- and
country-specific shifting behavior might provide useful in de-
signing specific tax legislation aimed at preventing income
shifting of Swiss MNEs.
Since the number of subsidiaries is low outside of Europe,
the CIs in Figure 12 are wide and conclusions based thereon
are inherently inaccurate. Therefore, future research on in-
come shifting of Swiss MNEs using the ORBIS database is ad-
vised to use a European sample, unless intercontinental data
is explicitly needed.
8. Limitations
The data and methodology applied in this thesis come
with several deficiencies. The limited access to ownership
data has far reaching economic and statistical consequences.
Parent firms of subsidiaries can not be identified and hence,
affiliates of a MNE cannot be linked to each other to form a
corporate group consisting of several affiliates. Thus, calcu-
lation of an aver- age tax differential is impossible. Several
authors find that MNEs significantly shift income between
subsidiaries of the same parent firm Huizinga and Laeven
(2008, 1174), Dischinger and Riedel (2008, 18-19). The
thesis at hand missed this potential part of income shifting
among Swiss MNEs. Further, parent firms cannot be ana-
lyzed as for example in Dischinger et al. (2014, 260-261).
However, this aspect of the ownership issue is outside the in-
fluence of the author of this thesis, and by using subsidiaries
with a Swiss parent holding a specified ownership share, a
satisfactory second-best solution was chosen.
The ownership data from ORBIS is reported for the last
available year only (2015 in most cases), and the owner-
ship categorization based on the variables OW_51i t and
OW_100i t is a snapshot thereof Dharmapala (2014, 430). By
assuming the ownership structure did not change over the
sample period, the sample potentially includes subsidiaries
with a smaller ownership share than 10% in earlier years.
While Budd et al. (2005, 76) argue that this measurement
error distorts the effect of the tax differential towards 0,
other approaches to this problem exist. Dischinger (2008,
15, 26) uses an OLS cross-section of the last available year to
qualitatively verify his results obtained from FE regressions
using the whole panel sample. This approach further allows
to include the ownership variable as a standalone term and
thus avoids possible bias introduced by leaving out terms
constituting an interaction term Brambor et al. (2006, 66-
68). Another solution is to use more sophisticated statistical
methods, such as the estimator proposed by Hausman and
Taylor (1981). This approach allows to consistently estimate
both time-variant and time-invariant regressors, while still
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity among subsidiaries
Wooldridge (2009, 325-326). Within this thesis, the esti-
mates of regressions including ownership share interactions
should be treated with care since they are possibly biased.
The unequal coverage of different countries and the low
coverage of tax havens in the ORBIS database has been men-
tioned often Fuest and Riedel (2010, 18), Clausing (2016,
906). Desai et al. (2006, 529-530) find that tax havens
are important elements in tax avoidance strategies of US
MNEs, and Clausing (2016, 906) mentions that research us-
ing the ORBIS database misses key observations from tax
haven countries that drive income shifting behavior.36 While
this limitation can be crucial to the validity of the research
in these papers, it is presumably of second-order importance
for the analysis presented here. Switzerland is defined a tax
haven by Desai et al. (2006, 517), hence every subsidiary in
the sample has the possibility to benefit from tax haven op-
erations (shifting income to the parent firm in Switzerland)
as defined by the aforementioned authors. Given the compa-
rably low CITRs in Switzerland, the tax benefits from estab-
lishing and shifting income to affiliates in other tax havens
is lower for Swiss MNEs than it is for other MNEs facing a
higher CITR. Thus, it is assumed that Swiss MNEs are un-
likely to have numerous affiliates incorporated in other tax
havens.
Overesch (2006, 19) finds that firms with loss carry-
forwards have a reversed incentive to shift income. Neglect-
ing loss carry-forwards might lead to distorted coefficient
estimates. In consequence, it is sensible to exclude sub-
sidiaries with loss carry-forwards, or offer a differing anal-
ysis for such firms. Overesch (2009, 9-10) mentions that
firms incorporated in high-tax jurisdictions with loss carry-
forwards constitute a suitable control group when studying
income shifting. Such firms are faced with a highly positive
tax differential, but can offset any profits with former losses.
Thus, the shifting incentive is mitigated and applying the
basic model from this thesis on a sample of firms with these
characteristics should result in an insignificant estimate of
the tax differential. Such an analysis could pronounce the
indirect evidence of income shifting found in this thesis. Be-
ing able to identify a suitable control group further allows
to use potentially fruitful approaches, such as difference-in-
difference analysis. Alternatively, loss carry-forwards could
be used as an explanatory variable, as done for example by
Buettner and Wamser (2013, 74).
9. Conclusion
The main objectives of this thesis were to investigate
whether Swiss MNEs shift income or not, and to verify if the
36However, Clausing (2016, 917) finds in the same study, that 4 out of 8
(including the top 3) key locations for income shifting of US MNEs in 2012
are industrialized countries in Europe, namely the Netherlands, Ireland, Lux-
embourg and Switzerland. The coverage in these countries is higher Kalemli-
Ozcan et al. (2015, 7), and the criticism is partially mitigated.
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income shifting behavior of Swiss MNEs depends on certain
firm and country characteristics. The drivers studied in this
thesis are the scale of operations, the amount of intangible
assets, the ownership share and the direction of shifting. A
large body of empirical literature has shown that specific tax
law effectively deters income shifting. The absence of such
tax law in Switzerland in combination with comparably low
statutory tax rates gave rise to the suspicion, that income
shifting of Swiss MNEs is large.
The thesis at hand provides indirect evidence of income
shifting among Swiss MNEs. The benchmark regression has
shown, that a 1 percentage point increase in the tax differ-
ential is associated with a decrease of the subsidiary’s EBIT
by 1.458%. Moreover, this semi-elasticity is larger than re-
cent results from comparable studies using samples of Euro-
pean firms, possibly because Swiss MNEs face larger income
shifting opportunities than otherwise similar European firms.
Additionally, this thesis identified the scale of operations and
the ownership share as significant determinants of income
shifting behavior of Swiss MNEs. The sensitivity of the EBIT
to changes in the tax differential increases with the scale of
operations and the ownership share. Quantitatively, the pre-
ferred regression shows that increasing the ln fixed assets by
1 leads to a decrease (absolute increase) in the semi-elasticity
of the EBIT w.r.t. the tax differential of −0.612. The differ-
ence in semi-elasticities between wholly-owned subsidiaries
and subsidiaries with an ownership share between 10 and
50.99%, is estimated at −3.613. Hence, Swiss MNEs shift in-
come using large, wholly-owned subsidiaries. The preferred
regression implies that a 1 percentage point increase in the
tax differential translates into a 1.322% decrease in the EBIT
of wholly-owned subsidiaries with mean ln fixed assets, mean
ln intangible fixed assets and shifting direction to the parent.
Intangible assets and the direction of shifting are less impor-
tant drivers of income shifting of Swiss MNEs.
It was further shown, that income shifting activities of
Swiss MNEs are probably different across industries. Against
expectations, the extent of income shifting of Swiss MNEs
did not decrease over time, but remained stable in recent
years. Swiss MNEs shift income mainly from high-tax coun-
tries in Northern and Western Europe to Switzerland. It is
again stressed, that all results should be considered with re-
spect to the mentioned limitations.
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